I want to finally begin to address some of the issues and perspectives that James raised, now that I have had more time to think about them.

James, it seems we have a few different models at play in our articles: causation, correspondence, congruence.

If I understood correctly (and obviously please tell me if I have not), we both agree that the U.S. does not have the power to instill a sense of discontent and desire to rebel among Iranian masses (not that we see masses in the street now). However, if I understood, that’s not really what matters — a process as a whole is more than just a cause, and more than just the conscious calculations of the moment, and I think we both still agree here.

Correspondence seems more passive, almost accidental, or incidental: lo and behold, two different sets of actors, with somewhat different agendas, have a common goal, that is, to unseat Ahmadinejad. One set of actors might want to stop right there, the other wishes to go further. They work separately, they stay separate, but really the efforts of one may reinforce the efforts of the other, not by design, but as a consequence.

We seem to agree that there are now efforts by the U.S. to infiltrate and subvert Iranian politics, the broader sphere of information control, while aiding armed groups. The difference seems to be whether we think this is significant to present events, or how significant.

Congruence to me seems more proactive — we have goals in common, let’s work together, or, we have been working along parallel tracks so now let’s join our tracks. This might be closer to the position of the current Iranian government, which is not shy about accusing some if not all protesters of working in collusion with foreign interests. Would collaboration and collusion be appropriate synonyms for what you call congruence?

While I may not be tempted to argue that there is an American hand in everything happening in Iran…I would be astounded if absolutely NO element of the opposition had no covert ties to American, British, or Israeli agencies. Political expedience, if nothing else, can compel some to seek assistance wherever they can get it — and we do have many examples of “threats to America” who were once on the CIA payroll, from Manuel Noriega to Saddam Hussein, to the people we now call the Taliban. Mousavi as Prime Minister himself purchased weapons from the CIA when it was expedient, involving Israelis in the sale. So it would be surprising that with up to $400 million to play with, that the CIA had no penetration inside Iran whatsoever.

However, you also had a much broader point, one that I downplayed or just plainly left out of my own article, and I think it is a critically important theoretical and analytical point:

Iran is inserted within a specific geopolitical order, as a nation-state in interaction with other nation-states within the world-system. Iran has “negative ties” to the U.S. in the form of sanctions, diplomatic hostility, competing spheres of influence, etc. To take a pair of scissors to a web and start cutting through the web, deciding that this belongs to Iran and that belongs to the U.S. may then be a feckless exercise. The U.S. is a factor in the various equations that introduce stress within Iranian politics. Indeed, if there has been electoral fraud, it is to preserve a politically conservative “tough guy” who will ensure adherence to Islamic laws (in opposition to complete Westernization) and “stand up” to Israel and the U.S. To the extent that the ruling political elite may be overly anxious to preserve such a figure in office, that may itself provoke the kind of unrest of see from the out group, but it is not unrest that can be seen as totally divorced from the conflict with the U.S. and other Western interests.

Is that what you were arguing? Which parts did I get wrong?

PS: I should revise some of my own caveats, I think I may have worded them too strongly.

Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran:

http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/06_iran_strategy.aspx

PowerPoint:

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0623_iran/0623_iran_ppt.pdf