A report by the Center for Naval Analyses, as mandated by Congress last year as a precondition for releasing further funds to the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System, declares that HTS is a success, and at worst, a victim of its success. The report is primarily focused on management structure (not managers), organization, recruiting, the “metrics” of success, and policy and regulatory issues (p. 1). It now seems more than likely that the report was a formality as part of a public, political window-dressing act where Congress ostensibly “responds” to criticisms and controversies surrounding HTS, but with every intention of continuing the program. Indeed, that is a fitting conclusion, considering that the report came on the eve of the announced resurgence and expansion of the program.

It’s a Success, and a Victim of its Success

While “success” is the overarching theme of the report, at no point do we find a CNA explanation of what it means by “success,” and indeed it remains the big mystery word of the entire report, even when the CNA investigators themselves note that HTS also lacks a formal understanding of success and how to gauge it. Here is the first declaration of success, appearing right up front in this report, which serves more as a justification for continuation of the program than an in-depth analysis of the many criticisms of the program:

“First, the HTS program has been, in many ways, a success. It is a unique and dynamic program, and its leadership and staff have been able to generate a new and innovative capability within a bureaucratic environment that is not always open to such initiatives. In our interactions with HTS personnel and staff, we consistently came across individuals who were deeply committed to the mission, which most likely has also contributed to its successes. The program also has support within the Army leadership. General David Petraeus, who recently became commander of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, is a staunch supporter. There are some indications in the data we collected for this assessment that this capability fills a gap for the war-fighter and therefore has made an important contribution to U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan” (p. 2)

The CNA does note that there have been criticisms of the program—largely muffled—but argues that they are rooted in “misunderstandings” and that they tend to focus on issues of decision-making and specific incidents (which, as critics of HTS, we know is an entirely deceitful characterization):

“the program remains the target of criticism. Part of this appears to stem from specific incidents and poor decisions that have occurred within the program, such as sending unqualified personnel into combat zones. Our analysis suggests that poor internal communications and the absence of an overall outreach or communications strategy may also be contributing to a misunderstanding of the program’s goals and operations. This may also account for some criticism” (p. 2).

Given the immense, and usually favourable, media coverage devoted to HTS and often stage-managed by HTS, one has to wonder how the CNA came to the conclusion that HTS lacked a communications strategy, or in which ways the program’s “goals and operations” were misunderstood. Since the very report itself was mandated at the culmination of a wide range of critical opposition, one would be justified in expecting some more detailed and careful treatment of these points. Instead, we have vague and obscure generalizations.

Some Anthropologists are Opposed to HTS

“For numerous reasons,” we are told, but without going into any detail, “some anthropologists are opposed to the program. To learn more about the nature of these concerns, we recommend the reader refer to the ‘AAA Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) Final Report on The Army’s Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program,’ Submitted to the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association, October 14, 2009.” At no point in this report does the CNA simply lump a major theme under a single reference and tells the reader to go elsewhere—usually there is an attempt at a summary. “In addition,” they continue, “there is also an active blog community made up of a variety of outspoken individuals who oppose the program” (fn. 4, p. 2)—but no links, because the understanding is that Congress should not be made aware of any of our criticisms. Indeed, the CNA explicitly prefers to avoid them: “we do not directly wade into the broader debates surrounding the HTS program that are currently taking place on various websites and blogs” (p. 11). Somehow missing the lead role played by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists—which is never mentioned even once in the report by name—the CNA states: “A key stakeholder in this debate is the academic community, most prominently represented by the American Anthropological Association” (p. 12). We will return to what the CNA says about academics’ criticisms, and relationships with universities, further down.

The problems the CNA found/chose to examine were these:

1. Recruiting/hiring of unqualified team members
2. High rates of attrition among HTS team members
3. Contract ceiling being reached, halting HTS operations
4. Timecard problems
5. Frustration over permanent duty station assignment for Department of Army Civilians who rotate or transit through Fort Leavenworth
6. HTS program management (p. 8).

The Assessment

The CNA does acknowledge that there were limits to what it could assess and how:

“A significant portion of HTS activities and operations take place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, given the 90 day time-frame we were allotted to conduct this assessment, the CNA assessment team was not able to travel to either theater to conduct our research. As a result, we relied mostly on information we could gather within the United States” (p. 10)

Relying on assessments from HTS’ own Program Development Team, the CNA reports that past PDT documents reveal “‘pockets’ of brigade commander feedback on the program—some positive and some negative” (p. 60), but also notes that there is a reason why there would be less negative feedback: “It was also voluntary for a unit to participate in the survey, thus units who were positive about their HTTs tended to participate, while those that had not had positive experiences with their HTTs were not” (p. 61). On a positive note, and unlike the mainstream media, Appendix B of the CNA report has detailed comments from brigade commanders who were critical of the HTTs assigned to them and did not find them useful.

Interestingly, while judging the program to be a success, the CNA devotes many pages to describing the partial, incomplete, halting, inconsistent, uneven, and often confused nature of internal HTS self-assessments. Our question should be: if HTS judges itself to be a “success” (and secures CNA’s agreement on this front) then what do they mean by success and how do they assess success? There is no clear and consistent answer. Indeed, even as the CNA explains at length that there were no consistent attempts to define or measure success, or that certain standard military assessment measures were never put in place, and that it is unclear who was the intended audience of the “mixed bag” of HTS assessments, and how the assessments resulted in decisions to change practices (if they did)—nonetheless, in spite of all of that, the CNA still begins its report with its primary conclusion: HTS is a success, and it’s the one basic, recurring term that it is consistently unable to define. Here are some examples of its findings:

“HTS has not relied heavily on metrics as part of past assessments procedures. Those that have been used have evolved over time, and have not been used consistently….In 2008, an effort was launched to develop a more formal assessment process similar to those in other military organizations. As part of that process, metrics have been developed, but apparently have not been employed….There has never been a permanent, fully-staffed component responsible for assessments within the HTS structure” (p. 69)

“It is unclear over time, what the exact purpose and goals of past assessments have been and who the intended audience is….Using the current approach it is difficult to do any trend analysis of the program because the tool used to assess the program’s performance and the final product has changed from year to year” (p. 70)

“There does not appear to be a formal process for implementing the suggestions/conclusions reached in the various” HTS internal assessments (p. 71)

“absence of clearly defined tasks and standards” (p. 71)

Even though they are unable to determine what success is, in the section following their detailed overview of the problems of HTS assessments, the CNA nonetheless continues with this line: “The HTS organization has been both blessed and cursed by its own success” (p. 73)

After charting poor recruitment, training and high attrition rates, the CNA still insists on concluding as follows:

“That HTS has succeeded at all (and it has had some notable successes [unspecified]) is a tribute to the hundreds of men and women who have dedicated themselves to making it happen. Many of the people we interviewed, including the most critical of HTS, indicated that HTS teams are performing a vital function. They contend that even if only a few of the teams are successful [meaning what?], the good work that the successful teams do is so important that it makes the whole enterprise worthwhile” (p. 109)

Stirring words.

Desperate and Unscrupulous Recruits, Optimism about Management

In the CNA investigators’ view, the most significant and persistent problem plaguing HTS has been recruiting (p. 3)—which is not to say that even with this limited scope they do not produce some interesting findings.

When speaking of recruitment and training, the CNA describes the work of the private defense contractor, BAE Systems, and its selection of candidates as ranging from “loose” in 2009 to “moderately selective in 2010—in the case of 2010, 60% of the total 1,342 applications received was rejected (p. 87). Interestingly, in speaking to a CNA interviewer, “BAE would not characterize recruiting as either good or bad but as ‘involved’” (p. 88). The CNA was not moved by this evasive non-explanation, and concludes:  “the quality of the personnel supplied under the BAE contract is substandard and is at the heart of most of the problems in the program….The government seems to have to take whatever BAE provides” (p. 106).

If this seems like it will take us on a journey through a maze of corrupt contractor practices and incompetent management, it would occasion disappointment, as the report spends more time outlining the unsuitable quality of recruits, and the bad economy that sends them to BAE Systems. As BAE itself told the CNA: “The weak economy had brought in some recruits….The weak economy has caused some of them to make the decision” (p. 89). The CNA says that the managers themselves found the recruits to be of poor quality: “Throughout HTS, managers comment on what they consider to be the poor quality of many of the recruits” (p. 90)—in some months, as many as 56% of trainees either resign and/or are dropped by the program. Again, the question persists: where in this do we see “success”?

What is an interesting revelation is that those in charge of recruiting and management suspected that many recruits are merely using HTS training for purposes other than serving HTS:

“Equally problematic is an apparently recent trend noticed by trainers of substantial numbers of recruits resigning at the very end of training—see for example the data of November 2009 and January 2010. The trainers tell us that many of these recruits seemed to have had no intention of actually deploying and were only there to collect pay for 4.5 months and get a security clearance….the substantial amount of pay collected during this interval may well be attractive,  particularly during this economic downturn. With the 4.5 months of training and a security clearance the recruit may also be able to get a lucrative long term job with another contractor” (p. 93)

As for the instructors, the CNA determines that 69% are from backgrounds that are “not relevant” to the stated requirements of the program (p. 96). As for the research managers, 76% are from educational backgrounds that are “not relevant” (p. 97) Of the deployed social scientists, 40% are from “not relevant” training backgrounds (p. 98) As for team leaders, 88% are from “not relevant” backgrounds: “On balance the team members’ academic specialties all too often lack real relevance to the behavioral and social science research backgrounds that the teams appear to need and is referenced in the position descriptions and the associated knowledge, skills, and abilities” (p. 100).

The CNA outlines what we already knew, that there has been a consistent lack of recruits with the necessary language skills, so much so that the requirement has been dropped (p. 101).

What is perhaps much more astounding, and never mentioned by the media, is the extremely high number of those being fired or resigning once they have already been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan: “we estimate that about 8 deployed team members are relieved from duty each year and about 80 team members resign while on deployment” (p. 102)—then, by its own reported numbers of persons deployed (157), that would mean about half of all deployed HTS team members either resign or are relieved of duty.

Even though the CNA did say that as many as 76% of all managers come from irrelevant backgrounds, the CNA is more positive in its commentary about managers. The CNA writes: “In general, there is reason for optimism about HTS internal management. The management structure has greatly improved in the last 12 months. Of note, there has been the addition of a Chief of Staff, several key replacements in directorates, and the organization is in the process of converting all remaining contractors that currently head directorates in government civilian status” (p. 5).

The CNA did assess the quality of the recruits. Did it do the same with respect to managers? No: “It is important that the reader understand that we were not asked to assess the quality of the managers, but only to comment on the adequacy of the structure” (p. 41). Even when it seems that the CNA might take a critical turn—“Given media reports (at least some of which we believe to be substantially correct) of inappropriate behavior on the part of some team members, it is reasonable to question whether the management is, in fact, adequate to the task” (p. 44)—the CNA pulls back: by inadequate management they mean management structure, and they proceed to recommend that there be more managers, following models that include those of management gurus like Peter Drucker. The problem with the managers is…there are not enough of them. As for management problems, the CNA concludes there is “reason for optimism” that all of the necessary changes to improve HTS management are well underway (p. 48).

Quite aside from the issues raised above, and included only because it supplements the photos provided by former HTS employee John Allison, what is interesting are the CNA’s notes about the HTS training facility:

“The physical plant for training at Fort Leavenworth can be described as Spartan. Until recently, training has been conducted in a group of trailers. The facility has been ‘upgraded’ and now occupies the basement of a small shopping center. The space consists of classrooms for students and cubicles for instructors. When we visited each of the classrooms was occupied with 15-25 students. Many of the classrooms are noisy due to the nature of the air conditioning system—making it very difficult to hear the instructor. During our visit, the instructors were experimenting with a headphone system to enable students to hear them over the air conditioning. This was the first day with the system and it was not working well” (p. 91).

Anthropology and Academic Outreach

First, it is important to note that, contrary to the ways HTS tried to distance itself from anthropology in the U.S. mainstream media when it could no longer counter overwhelming criticism and rejection, the CNA does note that anthropology is a cornerstone of HTS’ preferred identity: “HTS emphasizes the use of tools and approaches commonly associated with the academic disciplines of anthropology and sociology in its efforts to collect and analyze data about local populations” (p. 1).

To overcome criticisms, the CNA recommends more academic outreach, but notes “HTS also faces negative attitudes within some academic circles. For example, some universities have been reluctant to work with HTS” (p. 6). This is repeated on page 122:

“HTS also faces the challenge of negative attitudes within some academic circles towards the HTS program overall. In some of its outreach efforts, HTS has already faced an unwillingness on the part of some institutions or individuals (in particular some within the Anthropological community) to work together.”

Yet, as we know already, HTS has been successful in gaining the cooperation of at least four universities, as charted by the CNA:

How to get around the lack of subject matter experts and persons with relevant qualifications? The CNA notes that “in a resource-constrained environment, seeking opportunities to leverage the expertise, programs, and work of outside organizations is a worthwhile endeavor” (p. 121).

The CNA proposes a simple, awful solution—that all of us become silently enlisted into training HTS recruits:

“An alternative for the long term is for HTS to ‘grow its own.’ Promising young officers could be selected for training program in social science and sent to an appropriate university for advanced degrees….One downside to this approach is that the military officer trained as a social scientist might have more difficulty gaining the trust of the local population than a civilian social scientist” (p. 121).

They still want anthropologists and academics for their legitimacy and credibility in being able to penetrate local communities—assuming those communities have no access to these debates, and some do. There is no consideration of the likelihood that once the association with military training has permanently burnt the reputation of anthropologists, they will then get about the same welcome as the military gets.

An alternative that the CNA points to, and we shall have to look at whether this materializes in the future, is for HTS to work with any of “a number of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs),” or “other public research institutions such as the center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Brookings Institution,” which, “may also be appropriate partners for HTS” (p. 122).

It is peculiar that the CNA chose to blame the overwhelming criticism on HTS lacking a strategic communications plan for outreach to academic organizations, noting that HTS also lacks a directorate or individual within HTS who has the assigned responsibility for pursuing relationships and partnerships with academic organizations (p. 121)—yet we do know that Montgomery McFate attended anthropology conferences specifically with the aim of recruiting people, and that she featured herself in numerous articles about HTS.

More than One Human Terrain Program

With the assistance of an officer in U.S. military intelligence, we already posted some information on other human terrain capabilities in the U.S. military, as well as similar functions of SCRATs, and we identified multiple human terrain programs. The CNA charts some of these, but does not address the question of why HTS is therefore needed when its capabilities have been multiplied across several domains.

Also of Interest, Some Facts and Figures:

Number of Human Terrain Teams Deployed:

• Number of deployed Human Terrain Teams in Iraq is 10, or 92 personnel
• Number of deployed Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan is 17, or 65 personnel
• Total persons deployed 157–for May 2010 (p. 19)

In addition, there are a further 7 Human Terrain Analysis Teams in Afghanistan, and 3 in Iraq (p. 21)

In Afghanistan, HTTs are deployed with the U.S. Army, Marines, NATO, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, Task Force Phoenix, and “3 other unspecified units.”

Of 555 employees in total (as of 18 June 2010), 101 were military personnel, 206 were private contractors, and less than half (248) were civilians (p. 76).

Funding:

“HTS was not able to provide us with a detailed budget” (p. 43) – instead, all they have is a general funding plan. From that (p. 43) we learn of the funding provided to HTS in the following fiscal years:

• 2008–$144,000,000
• 2009–$92,541,000
• 2010–$159,729,000
• 2011–$154,822,000

TOTAL = $551,092,000

* the program began in 2006, and no figures are supplied for 2006 and 2007

From those amounts, the following was spent on deployed teams:

• 2008–$77,950,000
• 2009–$72,061,000
• 2010–$125,752,000
• 2011–$112,261,000

The CNA judges the level of funding to be inadequate (p. 43).

The BAE recruitment contract, renewed in September 2009, is $380 million, over five years (p. 86).

Anthropologists in the Military:

Some interesting data on the total number of all civilians with degrees in anthropology employed by the Pentagon, as of September 2009 (pps. 113-114):

• US ARMY: 285 (160 with a BA in anthropology, 95 with a MA, 30 with a PhD)
• US NAVY: 119 (68 with a BA in anthropology, 30 with a MA, and 21 with a PhD)
• US MARINE CORPS: 15 (8 with a BA in anthropology, 6 with a MA, 1 with a PhD)
• US AIR FORCE: 70 (47 with a BA in anthropology, 17 with a MA, and 6 with a PhD)
• OTHER DoD CIVILIANS: 43 (39 with a BA in anthropology, and 4 with a MA)

TOTAL = 532 (322 with a BA in anthropology, 152 with a MA, 58 with a PhD)

The CNAR report vindicates, again, the stories and observations of the nearly 100 sources from inside the HTS program that were responsible for the production of a staggering 50 articles written over a two year period. It is in large measure their stories that were responsible for the severe rework of the program. Sound minds in the US Congress and within the US Army/OSD—including the AR-15 investigator should receive some sort of commendation for their efforts.

Now HTS is evolving into a program-of-record and is unabashedly an intelligence support program as everyone knew it always was. HTS teams will be a mix of information gatherers from a variety of military, intelligence and social science disciplines mixed with US Army warfighters and combat hardened contractors.

In short, the HTTs will become multidimensional teams capable of deploying around the globe with the capability to use “civilian power” but go kinetic in the snap of a finger. The Sri Lankan soldier who once said, “I fear Human Terrain Teams more than the CIA” was quite prescient.

The HTS effort will continue during Operation New Dawn in Iraq and is ongoing in Afghanistan. According to US Army FY2012 budget documents, the HTS program will expand into other combatant commands like AFRICOM.

According to the CNAR, US Army TRADOC leadership was largely ambivalent to the HTS program even as General David Petraeus, USA—and ostensibly the CG of TRADOC–aggressively supported the effort as the premier solution to the failure of American political and military to prepare the human-cultural terrain for American soldiers.

On their watch soldier/civilian casualties (KIA, WIA), a manslaughter and hostage case, and sexual harassment cases took place within HTS. That TRADOC leadership in G2 and up the chain of command in TRADOC tolerated this state of affairs is common but utterly distasteful.

And people get promoted while people and programs crash and burn around them?

Some say that the next generation HTS is doomed because the reputation of HTS is so horrid that many in the field will try to avoid getting ensnared in the social science/intelligence combination product that HTS pushes. Within the US Army’s budget documents justifying HTS and other intelligence programs, there is a note that indicates the costs have increased because more contractors are being used to perform intelligence tasks of all types–just so.

At any rate, two excerpts from the CNAR are listed below.

“It appears that HTS’s most significant problems revolve around human resourcing and the level of support provided to HTS by TRADOC. We believe that solutions to these immediate issues exist. We emphasize, however that, these issues are not new. Problems in human resourcing and support have been evident in HTS for years—and little has been done to address them to date. As a result, we conclude that a more fundamental problem may exist: there may be a lack of TRADOC institutional commitment to making HTS a success. Hence, while further exploration would need to be conducted to determine this definitively, it is possible that the HTS mission would be better served if HTS were located elsewhere, but potential alternatives are beyond the scope of this assessment.”

“It, it is unclear what the exact purpose and goals of past assessments have been and who the intended audience is. It appears that the Project Management Office was the primary recipient of HTS products and that TRADOC G2 has not received or reviewed HTS assessment products. Second, the current approach has made it difficult to conduct any trend analysis of the program’s development. Finally, there is not a formal process for implementing the suggestions/conclusions reached in the various assessments within HTS. Any organizational change that has come about due to past assessments has been the result of an informal decision-making process.”

“I recognize that this two year project, which overtly maps rural communities, trade connections and key local stakeholders with pastoralists around Hargesisa and Berbera, could be used as a resource for building Human Terrain Maps of this critical region of the Horn of Africa. We would be happy to do this in partnerships with [you]… As such there can be overt collection of Human Terrain data which opens the door to sensitively tailoring more in depth data collection. The project and Sazani Associates have a high level of buy in from the indigenous NGOs and will deliver tangible local benefits.”

“I have close personal ties to the security sector and I am aware of both the precarious nature of Somalia and the value of HTS for operationalising [a] military response. I am interested discussing the matter with an appropriate entity regarding the securing of resources for delivery of the project and would be grateful if you could forward this email on to someone within your company who may be interested. What we are look for is the funding to deliver the project and costs to support more in depth HT data collection and we are hoping that will be made easier when we finish registration as a IPVO early next month.” Sazani Associates

No wonder governments and indigenous populations around the globe are skeptical about the motives and practices of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) operating in their countries.

Take, for example, Sazani Associates, an NGO based in the United Kingdom. A representative named Mark Proctor from Sazani is looking to expand into the national security arena via the US Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS). They seek funding to MAP the HT in East Africa/Somalia.

Who knows how many other NGO’s have jumped on the cultural-human terrain mapping effort being funded out of OSD/TRADOC, AFRICOM or any of the other U.S. Combatant Commands. Or, perhaps, they are turning their data over, at a price, to elements the US national security apparatus to include academia.

“We are a UK based NGO who have offices in Tanzania and Belize and the majority of our work is around sustainable livelihood development and various forms of education. One of our areas of expertise is Zanzibar–our associates have a long history there, one being a fluent Kiswahili speaker. Islamic east Africa is therefore a place we are very comfortable to operate in. Having spent a little bit of time in northwest Somalia I was pleased to find the largest concentration of the Diaspora community in Europe in Cardiff, our local city (and capitol of Wales-semi autonomous region of UK). Over the years we have worked closely with this community and made the links to ensure a project could actually deliver in northwest Somalia.

This project was designed with three partners, the Universities of Somaliland (GOLLIS), Somali Progressive Society (UK) and Consortium of Somaliland Non Governmental Organizations (CONSOGO)(Somalia) all of which will be involved in delivering. The main contact for the UK Somali entity is an honorable man who is the president of the Somaliland Chamber of trade in UK, so he has access at the governmental level in Somaliland, which has proven helpful. As I said we have worked with him for a number of years. The project [called YES] is an enterprise-training and civil society engagement project developed with Somali partners by Sazani Associates. Sazani designed a $1.2M aid project with local NGO partners in Somaliland. Working with local Universities and a large Somaliland Government registered umbrella NGO, the project is aimed at supporting rural people to develop sustainable businesses, critical awareness of media and linking that to an export hub.”

The sales pitch goes on to say that the program is focused on “young people in their rural communities (pastoralists surrounding two main towns), developing businesses and creating a network of producers and an export centre. Mapping community interests, trade connections, key stakeholders and establishing relationships with them are central to the project delivery.”

Shadow Anthropology: And the Oscar Goes To…

The Human Terrain System was the subject of a play recently performed in California. “…an outstanding ensemble,” said LA Weekly.

The play is titled SHADOW ANTHROPOLOGY: A Post-9/11 Comedy. It was written and directed by Dr. Rick Mitchell of California State University, with music by Max Kinberg. There is even a song available from the show with lyrics by the playwright, music by Max Kinberg, and vocals by David Lee Garver.

Here is the story line:  As a poor Afghan family struggles to hold onto its farm in spite of a drought, a warlord offers possible solutions, including a more profitable crop, as well as an odd marriage proposal for the farmer’s young daughter. Soon thereafter, an idealistic anthropologist from Puerto Rico teams up with an opium-loving American mercenary as part of a U.S. Army Human Terrain Team. While the visitors attempt to create a more “culturally sensitive” military occupation of Afghanistan, various characters and bawdy shadow puppets battle it out for who controls not only the story, but also the land. A satirical examination of the U.S. military’s “new” post-9/11 strategy to win Afghan hearts and minds, this dark comedy features original songs, Turkish-style shadow puppetry, and Spam.

And the Oscar(s) for best ensemble performance in a drama goes to….General Martin Dempsey (USA) the new US Army Chief of Staff and his chain-of-command whilst at TRADOC. Their character acting as “leaders” was stunningly convincing even as the initial HTS program suffered casualties, mismanagement and burned to the ground on their watch.

[In connection with this article, please see the associated file uploads: COMISAF ppt or COMISAF pdf; FET pptx or FET pdf; ISAF Engagement with Females PDF; and the previous post: "Recommended ISAF Guidance for Female Engagement Teams"]

“In the time of Xerxes, it is documented that the King took advice from his Queen which significantly impacted a political issue and prevented mass genocide. We are still in Persia. Conversations still go on between men and women behind closed doors. To understand those conversations and more importantly how we may be able to influence them we must be able to access the females. Female Engagement Teams [FET] is a proven concept…The Marines do this well…To garner the full benefit of FET throughout the country, comprehensive ISAF guidance needs to be issued for Female Engagement Teams.” Combined Joint Intelligence Operations Center—Afghanistan—Strategic Intelligence Update, 23 February 2010. Briefing titled Recommended ISAF Guidance for Female Engagement Teams. Quote from slide number 13, notes.

It is not every day that a U.S. commanding general like Stanley McChrystal (USA, Ret.) signs a directive  (dated 31 May 2010, Engagement With Afghan Females Directive) that is based in some measure on the story of Persian King Xerxes and Queen Esther. Who knew that the story would be used to support FET’s, another 21^st Century U.S. Army COIN initiative to extract information from the population in Afghanistan? FET’s target is the 50 percent of the Afghan population that is female.

And who knew that “We are still in Persia?” Perhaps the metaphor should be this: The USA is becoming like the Persian Empire and is destined for an ending that befalls all empires.

The Book of Esther tells a wonderful yet completely fictitious story of Xerxes’ Jewish Queen Esther who ultimately saved the Persian Empire’s Jewish community from extermination/genocide. In the fable, King Xerxes wife even managed to convince him to allow the Jewish community within the Persian Empire a two day window in which to take revenge against its enemies in any manner it sought fit. The story as “a historical record must be definitely rejected” according to the Jewish Encyclopedia.

So let’s cut the FET’s authors/briefers some slack and look to Xerxes’ “real” Queen Amastris. Would she have been the type of person who “behind closed doors” could convince King Xerxes to spare a hounded segment of his empire? Herodotus—not exactly objective in these matters– claimed that “Amastris was cruel and vindictive. On one occasion she sacrificed fourteen youths of the noblest Persian families to the god said to dwell beneath the earth. The tale of her horrible mutilation of the wife of Masistes [cut her breasts off among other body parts] gives us a lively picture of the intrigues and cruelties of a Persian harem.”

Hey! This is the USA! We destroy history by night and recreate it by day.

Triangulation Nation: Teenage Engagement Teams Next?

According to the authors of the briefing, men, women and children are part of the triangle of knowledge that must be targeted for information collection. “In Afghanistan, we observe rather consistent themes: Men interpret information and tell you what they think you want to hear. Women see and hear what goes on behind the walls. Children run free in the community—they see, watch and are involved in nearly every activity in the community.”

The briefing’s authors note that children are to be targeted but with care. That high care quotient is rather odd given that Afghan children/teenagers have to navigate cluster munitions, land mines, ordnance from air and land, and hostile occupants and locals. FET’s (and PRT’s, HTT’s, HET’s) would seem to be the least of their problems.

“Children are a delicate engagement endeavor as we do not want to put them at risk. However, approximately 45 percent of the population is under age 16, impressionable and vulnerable and a prime target for enemy force recruitment. The future of Afghanistan rests with children. If we don’t engage then the enemy will so they will need to be considered in our human terrain targeting construct.”

FET’s proponents even support using Afghan adolescent male’s attempts to impress/court females as a tool to extract information. In short, any and every activity is in-bounds for information exploitation.

FET’s Sponsored by the Human Terrain System

Just like the ISAF Guidance presentation referenced above, a similar briefing from HTS describing/selling FET’s was prepared by Dr. LisaRe Brooks and is dated 28 October 2010. Dr. Brooks is an HTS member located at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. She offers the rationale—minus Queen Esther’s support—for the FET’s effort.

“Female engagements are an integral component of COIN by embracing  and understanding the missing 50% of the population; building relationships with the Afghan women to earn their trust, give women confidence in GIRoA (Afghan government] and divide them from those that violate their constitutional rights; and empower them to have a voice and ownership in solutions for problems in their families, villages, country. The desired end states are these: women influence families/ communities not to support the Taliban; women influence others (women) to demand basic services from the local government (with coalition force support); women influence family and community members to support GIRoA; and women do not support/ enable the insurgency.”

Females need to be involved in global COIN, in Afghanistan, in Iraq (The Lioness Program for example) and anywhere else males are a few cans shy of a six pack when it comes to treating females and minorities like equivalent human beings. In fact, women or anyone else qualified for tooth or tail US government operations—military, intelligence, stability, diplomatic—should be in decision making or frontline positions. If the premise is “All of Government, All of Society” in the ongoing American War Effort against terror, drugs and crime—and protection of the US Homeland– then every American is needed in the cause (including 16 year olds).

Further, females are essential to the success of any COIN/collective intelligence gathering operation as is suggested by some commentary/observations in the two FET’s briefings mentioned in this article. Social sensitivity is a big part of the reason. In October 2010, “A  new study co-authored by Carnegie Mellon University, MIT and Union College researchers documented the existence of collective intelligence among groups of people who cooperate well, showing that such intelligence extends beyond the cognitive abilities of the groups’ individual members, and that the tendency to cooperate effectively is linked to the number of women in a group.”  It makes perfect sense.

What makes no sense, however, is the US Army’s rush to field an inconsistently trained FET’s capability. Given its deadly experience with its own Human Terrain System–in which recruiting, training and management crippled the initial concept—it seems ludicrous to put FET’s on the fast track.

Indeed, in a 7 December 2010 teleconference interview with Colonel Chadwick Clark of the COIN Training Center in Afghanistan and Colonel Sheila Scanlon, Advisor to the Afghanistan Minister of the Interior had some choice responses for their questioners. They took pains to stress that FET’s was all volunteer and that other countries operate FET’s in Afghanistan. Training was a focus area of the interview:

“Well, right now, there is no standardized training for the FETS. The FETs receive training based on how they’re going to be employed. The Marine Female Engagement Teams that are being employed in Helmand in Regional Command Southwest go through four months of training prior to their employment. The Female Engagement Teams that are being employed in other places go through training that’s commensurate with how they’re going to be employed. I know that’s not a good answer, but really the training varies from anywhere from four months to a week’s worth of training.

We’re taking a look at is standardizing some of the training for all the Female Engagement Teams that are going to be employed in here. So probably sometime around the end of January [2011] we’ll have a program of instruction put together for all the Female Engagement Teams that are going to be employed, and it’s going to be focused more on understanding the operational environment and understanding their role in a Female Engagement Team.”

Currently, according to statements in the December 2010 interview, there are a total of 40 female engagement teams in Afghanistan with a minimum of two females per team. “So there are at least 80 trained females in the country right now, but 40 teams employed in each one of the regional commands. There are 17 in Regional Command Southwest, 5 in the South, 11 in the East, 6 in the North and 1 in the West.” A map of the FET’s locations is contained in Dr. Brooks briefing referenced above.

[The following consists of the speaking notes for a presentation delivered by Major Maria Vedder of the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System, from 23 February 2010, as a "strategic intelligence update." The original file can be accessed here as a PPT file and here as a PDF.]

SPEAKING NOTES: OPTION 1

Good Morning Sir, It’s not who I am but what I am that brings me here today.

I am a soldier with an identifier that enables me to garner information and build relationships with the population that is not accessible by some others – that identifier is my gender.

But it’s my training as a civil affairs officer and human terrain member that enables me to conduct the engagements in a manner to garner information in a proscribed manner and to understand the importance of capturing that information in such a way to disseminate it and share it with others. I’ve been in Helmand for 5 months working on female engagements.

SPEAKING NOTES: OPTION 2

Good morning, Sir.

I am Maj Maria Vedder, a civil affairs officer and member of the Human Terrain System. I worked 5 months in Helmand Province with RCT 7 before transferring to ISAF HQ to write a report that provides background, detailed methodology, and tactical employment considerations for female engagement teams.

NOTES:

Author: P. Maria Vedder, MAJ, Civil Affairs, US Army Reserves, ISAF HQ, Human Terrain System Theatre Coordination Element (HTS TCE)/ Civilian ORSA for TRADOC

Primary Contributor and Advisor: MSgt Julia Watson, Civil Affairs, US Marine Corp, Female Engagement Team (FET) OIC, 2nd MEB

USMC FET Program Advisor: COL Edward Yarnell, US Marine Corp (USMC), MEB, FECC

Tactical Employment Advisors: COL Randall Newman, USMC, Commander, RCT 7; LTC Mark Dietz, USMC, Commander, 2-2

Teammate & Research Methodology Advisor: Ms Kristin Post, Social Scientist, HTS, RCT 7, Human Terrain Team 7

Supplemental contributions and oversight by:

Dr. Montgomery McFate, HTS, Senior Social Scientist (Topic: Relevance)

Rebecka Bell, Independent consultant (Topic: Triangulation)

Christopher King, HTS TCE, Social Scientist (Topic: Convergence)

Capt. Matt Pottinger, CJ2x (Topic: Purpose)

Ms. Jali Jalani (Topic: Translator Responsibilities)

Maj N.J. Karczewski, TFL G-3 Assessments Deputy OIC (Topic: Assessment)

LTC Dave Hudak, TRAC Monterey (Topic: Assessment)

Mr. Jack Jackson, TRAC Monterey (Topic: Assessment)

Mr. Tim Perkins, TRAC Monterey (Topic: Influence; Assessment)

MAJ Major Cameron Grams, 2D MEB ANSF OCC-P (Topic: Influence; Information)

SPEAKING NOTES:

I am recommending that you issue ISAF guidance for female engagement containing the specific elements listed. Such guidance will ensure consistency in reporting that is gained through quality training and engagement methods…the consistency is to ensure that we don’t end up doing more harm than good with unintended culturally offensive mistakes and to gather information in a concise manner.

NOTES:

Sir – you signed an order in November directing units to “create teams to build relationships with Afghan females” but there is little consistency in the programs across the country… with varying degrees of success in contributing to the information repository on the total Afghan population that we seek to understand as part of the COIN environment.

As such, the recommendation is to develop ISAF guidance for female engagement teams to ensure consistency in reporting that is gained through quality training and engagement methods…the consistency is to ensure that we don’t end up doing more harm than good with unintended culturally offensive mistakes and to gather information in a concise manner.

BACKGROUND NOTES:

ISAF guidance for tactical employment of female engagement teams

Dedicated military females to engage the populace, focusing on Afghan females

Minimum 2 per battalion operating at company level

Task organized under civil military operations

Training Standards and Recruiting Protocol

Establish Assessment Tool

Defined mission

Measures of Performance and Effectiveness

Guided Question sets to inform the LOOs

Reporting standardized (CIDNE)

SPEAKING NOTES:

Many still question why we should single out females as focus of effort.

This stick guy represents the entire population.

In Afghanistan, you’ve got about half males, and half female.

But in Afghanistan, the culture segregates by gender. So the appropriate operational response that is culturally sensitive to that segregation is to interact male to male & female to female.

We want to understand 100% of the community by engaging them directly.

By doing so, we get the insight that we need, while being respectful of the culture, yet building the fundamentally essential social contracts founded on trust and established in a cooperative environment.….that social contract needs to be with the male and female population…both of whom are making decision about the future of this country, whether publicly or privately.

BACKGROUND NOTES:

Cultural Sensitivity:

The Afghan culture segregates by gender.

“Population is Center of Gravity”

The appropriate operational response to be respectful of the cultural norms is to enable female members of the coalition force to interact with the Afghan female population directly.

SPEAKING NOTES:

A question posed was why must military females be responsible for female engagement…why not others?

In non-permissive environments, the majority of information is collected by military members because of the high threat levels. So if we are to get information from the female half of the population, then military females will be the one’s getting the information because they are the only females operating in high threat areas.

The initial information gathered in the clear and initial hold phases of operations informs all future operations and sets the stage for non-lethal effect packages.

Long term, would hopefully find total transition of responsibility to GIRoA and the international community supporting sustainable development, pursuing economic prosperity , and human rights.

But the groundwork is done in those critical moments from the clear to hold phases….first impressions matter and the set stage for all future efforts. And women in this society must be considered because limited mobility creates constraints in their access to the needed support.

NOTES:

Because military females are the only females with access in a non-permissive environment when first impressions matter and when the commander’s critical information requirements are being gathered to determine the sustainment phases of the operation.

There are near term and long term value in all information collected on the battlefield.

The information collected by patrols in the battle space build the picture for future operation decisions such as how and where to apply CERP funds, how to develop IO packages, and where to focus security assets. Again, to know how to best use distribute our non-lethal resources for maximum gain in influencing the whole population, we must know what will appeal to the females too…particularly in consideration of their limited freedom of movement which requires more creative IO/CA/Medical response.

As security improves, the expectation would be more joint efforts with governance teams and R&D experts who have the money and the expertise to start making large scale improvement in the region.

Long term, would hopefully find total transition of responsibility to GIRoA and the international community supporting sustainable development, pursuing economic prosperity , and human rights.

But the groundwork is done in those critical moments from the clear to hold phases….first impressions matter and the set stage for all future efforts.

SPEAKING NOTES:

The population is “center of gravity” in COIN operations.

The whole purpose of engaging members of the local community is to understand what this enigmatic population is thinking and perceiving as we conduct operations.

The Human Terrain is composed of men, women, and children that must be targeted to gathering information.

In Afghanistan, we observe rather consistent themes

Men = interpret information and tell you what they think you want to hear

Women = see and hear what goes on behind the walls

Children = the children run free in the community; they see and watch and are involved in nearly every activity in the community

The population must determine whether to support EF or GIRoA

To understand which direction they are leaning, we must get feedback from all 3 entities

By doing so, we:

Corroborate what each entity is saying

Clarify what was meant by information gathered

Get convergence on the common theme that resonate with the population

And the overall caliber of the information we are gathering increases

Of note, the children are a delicate engagement endeavor as we do not want to put them at risk. However, approximately 45% of the population is under the age of 16…impressionable and vulnerable…prime target for enemy force recruitment. The future of Afghanistan rests with the children. If we don’t engage, then the enemy will so they need to be considered in our human terrain targeting construct.

BACKGROUND NOTES:

Post-Conflict Sustainable Stabilization:

In order to develop a population capable of self governance and internal security, the future generations of Afghans need the basic tools for development

To include but not limited to education, an active economy, basic sanitation, and infrastructure. Females are responsible for nurturing this community

The concept of triangulated engagement was presented by Rebecca Bell, an Independent Consultant on Governance, at a meeting arranged by MAJ Rice, Australian Major, Chief Instructor/Training and Learning Development Officer at the

Counterinsurgency Training Centre – Afghanistan Camp Julien, Kabul in December 2009.

The concept has been adapted by MAJ Vedder to represent female engagement in a tactical scenario and to describe the benefit of the 4 C’s. The adjustments are not the responsibility of Ms. Bell nor does the credit of this idea infer her support of the application of this technique in this environment.

The Marines employ their females as military teams. As such their missions are guided by standard military decision making process.

FET is useless if the information gathered doesn’t support the unit mission and if the work is not operationally relevant.

and properly rehearse.

This is NOT a good will mission.

Interaction to build good will is beneficial but as a military unit, there is a more important security responsibility that should be supported with guided purpose and intent for employing tactical units like FET.

Starting with the commander’s guidance and creating a plan with a concept of operations. This is particular critical so that the receiving units Know how to support the FET mission…to include understanding time on station requirements and named areas of interest. This makes it easier for the patrolling units to prepare for the operation

But the column on the far right is particularly critical. Likewise, if the information is to be captured for trend analysis, there must be guidelines and reporting requirements for topics discussed during engagements to Create a collective pool of knowledge from which can be extrapolated broader Conclusions applicable to the entire ISAF community

Background Notes:

Caliber of information is only as good as the interviewer, so training on how to Properly engage matters. But again, what comes OUT of the engagements, must go IN to a central repository for dissemination.

This concept brief was originally designed for the Human Terrain Team 7, RCT 7. It was adapted to FET because of the similarities in team employment.

SPEAKING NOTES:

Respecting the male role in conservative Afghan society is the most effective manner to enable female engagements.

When the elders are involved, the community supports, and they take responsibility for protecting the gathering of their females or opening homes to allow for military females to visit.

A military male leader requesting Afghan males to support female engagements has consistently been the most well received of the methods to organize female engagements.

NOTES:

Respecting the male role in conservative Afghan society is the most effective manner to enable female engagements. A military male leader requesting Afghan males to support female engagements has consistently been the most well received of the methods to organize female engagements. When the elders are involved, the community supports, and they take responsibility for protecting the gathering of their females or opening homes to allow for military females to visit. “Utilizing the tribal and government leaders incorporates them into the process and gives them ownership of the effort. If they believe that value exists in altering gender roles, then they illicit change in the community, not outsiders. If they bring the change, they will own it and we can leave.” (MSgt Watson)

Honoring conservative values protects the female engagement team members from unintentionally offending Afghan males. To do so enhances mission effectiveness by incorporating the males into the process which earns their support and ensures a welcomed reception by the females after the male leader of the household invites the military females into the home. By showing respect to the traditional values, the FET and the partnered military males demonstrate a cultural competence that is well regarded. The men maintain their honor publicly and privately while the women earn the freedom to engage in open dialogue with no feeling of threat. With the proper type of introduction, better information is garnered from both the male and female conversations with no offense to either.

Pictured is the district governors of Nawa. In each KLE, the battalion commander and I developed an approach for speaking with each individual before we departed on the patrol. Then the BN CDR (Male Military Leader) made introductions to the Male Local Leader asking permission for me (Military Female) to speak with the Local Male Leader about military females meeting with local females. In each instance, the topic was well received and EVERY Male Leader offered specific guidelines and suggestions on how, where, and when the best FET engagements should occur. No two were the same, but each was appropriate for that district and all have been followed through by either the USAID Representative, Gail Long in Garmsir or by the MEB’s FET teams. Particular now that FET members are being assigned for prolonged duty in the same area, which facilitates long term relationships and acceptance garnered by familiarity.

SPEAKING NOTES:

(Picture should be on the screen)

The female you see here is approximately 28, on her 8th pregnancy, 4 living children, 3 that you see here,

The eldest female aged 13 who is is off to the side is pregnant with her first child, married to an ANP member.

The father is employed by the ANP as a cook.

The 3 dead children died before their 8th month, not from disease, but from mal-nutrition because of the mother’s inadequate breast milk.

Why do you care what she has to say? Because EVERY female engagement informs the lines of operations and adds a different dimension to understanding the total population picture.

(Next click should bring up chart)

This chart shows the dimensions used by the MEB for district assessments. When comparing male responses and female responses some elements were similar while others were significantly different.

*Governance paralleled with the men’s findings.

*ANSF was similar but more dynamically informed because of the family relations with the ANP.

*Security showcased as a distinct difference in definition. Men defined security in kinetic terms, while women were more concerned for the household and children’s safety.

But one area showcased as an opportunity to support improvement quickly. (link to next slide)

NOTES:

* Security was a major concern because the father feared for the women and even his son, because they were the only women within about a mile with no other families nearby; only single, young men of the ANP and road construction crews.

* Contributing to the enemy threat capability, the father discussed having been a prisoner of the Taliban in the past, which no one at the ISAF base knew.

*The wife’s health and daughter’s first pregnancy was an immense concern for the husband. This differed from the male military assessment.

* Assessment Tool

In the military, we gage unit success with assessment tools that are generally based off of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness that are linked to Individual and collective tasks. FET should be no different.

Use of Assessment Tool

guide female engagements

collect data on the female population

inform the command regarding the female population in the battle space

Nest with the ISAF Assessment Technique

Model after MEB Assessment Tool

Nests with the ISAF assessment metrics

Derived from the Sub-National Assessment Model

Assesses along the lines of the LOO’s

Security

Governance

Reconstruction &Development

ANSF

Establish MOEs and MOPs

Provides Topical Guides for Engagements

Information Collection Initiative for Trend Analysis

SPEAKING NOTES:

Taking what we learn from assessments and responding to the concerns when we can makes a tremendous contribution to the social contract we desire.

The primary income of the family was cooking for the ANP. The women cooked and the father took the food to the camp where he served meals with his son’s help. As such, the women were directly contributing to the economic stability of the family. Improvement in the family quality of life is directly impacted by their ability to produce more in the home. This was not capture as an economic indicator by the male assessment

More importantly, a small effort of buying a tea pot tripled there ability to produce tea to sell to the ANP and improve sanitation for the family. This small effort demonstrated that the concerns were heard, helping build confidence in the population that ISAF is present to assist GIRoA in taking care of them.

NOTES:

(Next Click brings up photo of tea pot and “Make No Promises” box.

During engagements, FET can not make promises, they can only listen. But when possible, answering a few needs can make a tremendous impact. An $8 tea pot bought in Golestan bazaar, flown on a CH57 back to main base, and put on a convoy back to Bakwa….meant that the family doubled their bread production and ability to serve more tea, faster to the ANP. Simply by asking for the commander’s support at the request of the father, the local translator started teaching the son. And a USO care package put socks on the youngest children. Simple, cheap and quick solution that endeared this family to the local base. We’ve been drinking 3 cups of tea, now let’s help them start making the tea.

SPEAKING NOTES:

ANSF is growing its female representation. As the capacity grows, FET can help inform the recruiting effort and garner information about how the public percieve females in ANSF. And then partner with them for training and development.

NOTES:

A senior civilian asked, why are ISAF females engaging local females, why aren’t ANSF females engaging the local females. Excellent point…ultimately, ANSF taking care of ALL security needs is the endstate…to include female engagements.

But the problem of recruiting for ANSF is systemic. Recruiting males is difficult at this, presenting a myriad of hurdles impeding military age males from joining the force. These include low literacy, dishonorable reputation, low pay, separation from family. These exist for women too but in addition, a layer of difficulty specific for women is present to include traditional attitudes of negativity to women in the work place, association of women in the police force being disreputable, and perception of women being socially alienated from the community. These comments came from a focus group with ANSF males regarding their female colleagues.

The professionalization of ANSF is occurring in part through partnership with and mentorship from ISAF. CSTC-A has recruitment goals for both male and female ANSF members. But reaching these goals will require both partnership for both genders and understanding of the recruiting barriers and negative public perceptions.

FETs help to inform recruiting by asking women what would motivate them and their families to allow them to be in the ANSF. Likewise, FET can garner the female’s perceptions of other females in the ANSF because there is likely a substantial influence on the eligible females from the elder females.

Partnership would be similar to the males partnership efforts, both at the academies and in the units which support training and professional development.

SPEAKING NOTES:

Females sometimes think to ask questions that males will not.

With this doctor, discussion topics included abortions, birth control, female hygiene, vitamin deficiency leading to child malnutrition from inadequate breast milk, and sexually transmitted diseases.

NOTES:

None of these topics had been broached by the male corpsmen at the COP out of concern for being culturally rude in questioning the doctor. Likewise, they had made the assumption that no females visited the clinic because they never saw them. The doctor laughed at this suggestion, saying that the corpsmen never visited before 1000 and all women were seen prior to 8AM so that they could tend to their children and responsibilities at the home…therefore, he saw them first.

SPEAKING NOTES:

FET are engagement teams. While distinguished by their ability to engage females, they can also engage males.Males will interact differently with females, providing different insights.

NOTES:

Many males are very comfortable speaking with military females; finding them an anomaly, intriguing, and less threatening than male service members…particularly the adolescences who also happen to be the most impressionable for recruitment by enemy forces. Allowing for the natural instincts of young males desiring to impress females would be naïve, so using that desire to interact to our advantage is wise when done respectfully to both the female service member and Afghan males.

Females will generally get different and sometimes more in depth information from males than will other males. For instance, the men on the right are security guards for a construction company. When asked if they would join the ANA, they said yes. When asked if they would join the ANP, they said no because it was not honorable and paid poorly. This was reiterated in another village, going even further to say that the dishonorable ANP job would hurt their ability to marry as well. With wealth and marriage being a key tenant to Pashtu “nang” or honor…the statements provided unique insight into why recruiting for the ANP was so poor.

The kids and young adults in the picture on the upper left had never seen a female service member. In this photo, we are teaching each other how to count one to ten in English and Pashtu respectively. Their recurring request was for a school for their village. One young man stated that he wanted to be a pilot. Small statements on the surface but poignantly indicative of the desire for education and future employment in a professional occupation. Having educated youth who desire to be pilots will achieve more for long term security because at this point, their other options are limited, making them easy recruitment targets for the enemy.

In the time of Xerxes, it is documented that the king took advice from his queen which significantly impacted a political issue and prevented mass genocide.

We are still in Persia. Conversations still go on between men and women behind closed doors.

To understand those conversations and more importantly, how we may be able to influence them, we must be able to access the females.

FET is a proven concept that demonstrates that effective, culturally respectful engagements can support the mission and help build confidence with the entire population. The Marine’s are doing this well and they have a model that should be replicated.

To garner the full benefit of FET through out the country, comprehensive ISAF guidance needs to be issued to maintain persistent engagement with systemic information collection.

“If the expansion of the Human Terrain System gains traction at TRADOC it could kill any efforts to develop a cultural expertise construct by the Civil Affairs community, specifically the Civil Affairs Proponent at USA JFK SWCS.  Everybody is looking to get as much money as they can for their organizations as the Defense budget begins to get squeezed. Naturally there could be a potential dog fight between TRADOC and any other Army organization making claims for HTS-like capability. Once something becomes institutionalized in the military it is difficult to change the new status quo.”

Major Brad Striegel’s (US Army Reserve) paper titled “Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Review” is an exceptional study of the US Army’s Civil Affairs past and present. Initially written in March 2008–and updated in December 2009–it’s a must-read for Civil Affairs students and military historians. U.S. Army leaders focused on cultural analysis/stability operations should—if they have not already–spend time with the paper. **

There is also an excellent reading list that includes the title Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors written in 1961 by Albert Weinberg and Harry Coles. A fantastic read, the 900 page book focuses on U.S. military Civil Affairs activities in World War II. Adding support to the cliché “What is Past is Prologue”, there is this gem in the introduction:

“Because of the ideological aspect of the struggle and because the United States acted as a member of a coalition of Allies, U.S. military leaders sometimes had to add to their traditional roles as soldiers those of the statesman and the politician. They were beset by the problems of resolving conflicting national interests and of reconciling political idealism and military exigency. On another level–in feeding hungry populations, in tackling intricate financial and economic problems, and in protecting the cultural heritage of a rich and ancient civilization-they had to exercise skills that are also normally considered civilian rather than military.”

In 2009, 47 years later, Edward Burke’s “Leaving the Civilians Behind: The Soldier Diplomat in Afghanistan and Iraq” would examine the same subject.

So it turns out, writes Striegel, that  U.S. Army Civil Affairs has been at the type of tasks performed by the Human Terrain System and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in various forms since 1847. According to Striegel (citing FM 41-10, 1/93),

“In the conduct of military government in Mexico in 1847, General Winfield Scott demonstrated that properly conducted CMO saves the combat commander problems with the civilian populace. He maintained that CMO saved lives, money, and supplies and often guaranteed military success when no other factor was effective. General Scott exercised the specialized functions of CA that we know today as the CA functional specialties. In using these functions under military control, he used reliable native personnel in existing civilian agencies of government in support of his military control over the populace.”

Canaries in a Coal Mine

“We had this [Human Terrain System] in World War II” writes Striegel.

Striegel believes that the Human Terrain System is a forgotten Civil Affairs competency.  He writes that new civil affairs like constructs such as U.S. Army TRADOC’s Human Terrain System and Provincial Reconstruction Teams are

“canaries in a coal mine that warn of the capability gaps of CA FX SP. Concepts like targeted recruiting and providing direct commissions to produce functional specialists, much like the specialist branches of today, have not been implemented since WW II, although a recent initiative a USA JFK SWCS now proposes such direct commissioning. No real overarching plan was ever implemented for CA FX SP training after World War II.”

Since that time, Striegel writes that the Civil Affairs community has been sleeping at the wheel while the rest of the Army was filling capability gaps that Civil Affairs should have nurtured, developed and updated.

“The same thing is happening with Agricultural Detachment Teams run by the National Guard. These are both Civil Affairs functional specialty capabilities and we are supposed to have them in our formations but we don’t. The community was blinded and distracted by its Special Operations moniker for decades until it was divested from Army SOF in 2006.”

Striegel writes that more people in Civil Affairs cared about jumping out of airplanes (a costly exercise) and tactical Civil Affairs than the Operational and Strategic Civil Affairs capabilities that Civil Affairs Functional Specialists (like those in HTS) now provide.

Human Terrain System Growing? Allies Joining?

Tony Bertuca of Inside the Army recently interviewed Colonel Sharon Hamilton, program manager of the HTS. In “New Director Makes Changes: Army Increasing Number Of Human Terrain Teams”  Hamilton claims that HTS is expanding and cites a CENTCOM request for more Human Terrain Teams and that the HTS program is cooperating with “allies” although she would not name them.

Five of those allies are Germany, Israel, the UK, Australia, and Canada.

The fact is that the world’s major military powers already have their own versions of HTS.  Many of them will be at the Defense Geospatial Intelligence Conference in the UK in January 2011. A feature of the conference is the Human Terrain Analysis Focus Day. An American company SCIA will be leading a seminar on GIS and Human Terrain Analysis according to the program bulletin. Dr. Swen Erik Johnson, senior social scientist at SCIA—who claims to have developed the first HTT for DOD in 2005—will likely be in attendance. The US Army Corps of Engineers and an element of the US Marine Corps will also be in attendance.

HTA Day features this:

“This day will focus on the need for every defence intelligence organisation to develop a human terrain analysis strategy. Most intelligence and geospatial organisations in defence forces around the world are or will soon be tasked with developing and implementing a human terrain strategy. This means you will have to learn about human terrain analysis, set goals and implement an effective strategy in your organisation. Join this focus day to learn from the pioneers, who have already implemented an HTA strategy and who have run programmes and projects in Afghanistan. Build your strategy based on ideas, mistakes and successes of the pioneers. Learn from the experts in HTA about the best solutions, technologies, strategies and implementation processes.”

No doubt, Colonel Hamilton has done some excellent work while at the helm of HTS. Bertuca’s article cites some of the changes Hamilton has forced: bringing work in-house, jettisoning incompetent personnel, creating oversight, reaching out to academia, etc.

Those actions are arguably the result of the US Army AR 15-6 investigation; the Center for Naval Analysis report; some good people in the media, DOD and the U.S. Congress; plus the 100 or so “sources” speaking through the 47 article HTS series written over the past two years. Those sources have been vindicated on just about every level—they deserved better than they got. And those killed and wounded while with HTS? It’s tragic and a shame.

At any rate, skeptics within DOD are not sold on HTS. They say it is too early to tell how HTS will evolve from this point on: the new system has only been in place for a heartbeat.  Many in academia believe that HTS has such a bad reputation that highly qualified social scientists will never apply for work in the program.

Others believe that the comments made in Bertuca’s piece are little more than a public relations gimmick engineered by Maxie McFarland to gain scarce funding from the US Congress. In this view, the Inside the Army piece is just the beginning of a strategic communication effort that will find its way into the MSM.

Whatever the case, it is unclear why U.S. Army Civil Affairs—rich with history and lessons learned—is being left to wither away. HTS-type functions always belonged in U.S. Army Civil Affairs as has been stated throughout this HTS series.

**Inside the Army – 12/13/2010

New director makes changes: Army Increasing Number Of Human Terrain Teams; Advising Allies

The Army is ramping up its controversial Human Terrain Systems program and will be sending more teams to Afghanistan this summer while simultaneously working with allied nations seeking to develop their own HTS capabilities, according to the program’s director.

The HTS program operates by embedding anthropologists and social scientists with military units in Iraq and Afghanistan to help provide commanders with a sense of cultural understanding when making decisions. It has been controversial among some in the anthropological community who question its value and ethical practices.

But the program continues to grow, despite various criticisms from academia and government. Col. Sharon Hamilton said in a Dec. 8 interview that U.S. Central Command has issued a requirement for 31 HTS teams in Afghanistan – an increase of nine teams — by this summer.

“I use that definitely as a metric for the success of our teams,” she said.

“The fact that Central Command increased the requirement for the number of teams they would like on the ground says a lot. CENTCOM has a limited amount of resources it has been allocated, so any time they request a human terrain team, it’s a zero sum, there’s something else they cannot request.”

There are now 10 HTS teams operating in Iraq and Hamilton said the Army has decided to keep them there as long as American forces remain in the country.

“The fact that we have 10 teams there when many of the enablers and support elements have been withdrawn from country — the human terrain capability is one they want to keep as long as U.S. forces remain,” she said.

Hamilton also said her program has been working with allied nations that want to develop their own HTS programs. She would not say which countries were interested, but noted that a Canadian general was said to be very impressed with the program.

“We directly support six allied nations and they are all very interested,” she said. “Several of the allies have approached the Department of the Army wanting to develop their own capability because they have our teams with them in Afghanistan. We’re doing knowledge exchanges [and] we’ve have several representatives from other countries visit our training, visit our teams on the ground in Afghanistan.”

The program, however, has been marked by controversy for several years, with troubling reports in academia and the media culminating in a House Armed Services Committee decision to direct a review of HTS earlier this year.

Shortly thereafter, HTS director Steve Fondacaro was released and replaced with Hamilton, who began serving as interim HTS director in June. Hamilton said the program is also no longer advised by Montgomery McFate, the once-celebrated social scientist who was instrumental in the development of HTS.

Hamilton said a new chief social scientist, Chris King, had been named to replace McFate and would begin in January once he returned from working with an HTS team in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the congressionally mandated report was conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses and presented to the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Department in September. The report has not been cleared for public viewing, according to a Pentagon spokesman.

Hamilton said she could not discuss specifics in the report, but said its overall message was that the government needed to be more involved in the administration of the program and rely less on contractors.

“There were definitely some assessments we needed to respond to,” she said.

“Previously, we had very few government personnel in the structure of HTS and not a good situation as far as government oversight. I think it validated the fact that we needed to have processes and standards in place.

What it really reinforced was that we truly were an organization that needs to switch from an entrepreneurial approach to a more established institutional approach, which means you put standards and processes in place so that you do have recurring actions, so that you do have normalcy with how you handle administrative processes.”

Hamilton said several administrative changes had been made since she took the helm and brought on more government personnel. She has hired a senior civilian to oversee administration and logistics support of teams in theater, brought on an information technology director and hired a civilian training director and assistant training director.

“These are all new positions and all positions that were previously done by contract personnel,” she said.

Hamilton said she also has stepped up the program’s engagement with the academic community by attending conferences for relevant groups, namely the American Anthropological Association, an organization that has remained steadfastly critical of the program.

Robert Albro, a professor of international communication at American University and a member of the AAA commission that authored a 2009 report criticizing HTS, called the program a “non-starter.”

“If you’re going to say that you’re bringing anthropologists to bear, then you have to allow the people you’re calling anthropologists to work in ways that meet their own professional obligations,” he said in a Dec. 9 interview. “Human terrain teams operate in a context where it’s very hard to understand how ethical considerations aren’t made deeply problematic. It’s hard to do ethnography at the point of a spear. It’s done over long periods typically measured in years, not even months.”

A congressional source who had knowledge of the CNA report told ITA that it mainly criticized the program for managerial issues.

“In reality, the program office until very recently was pretty thin and that actually accounted for a lot of the problems,” the source said. “The HTS management office didn’t have a great interface with TRADOC and that resulted in not having a lot of the back office support you would have expected. The Army is going back now and professionalizing it. It brings it more into the TRADOC fold.”

The source also said the report identified many problems with training HTS personnel, mostly the high number of candidates who “washed out” late in the process because they were not properly evaluated by the Army.

“The problem with using that [Army evaluation system] with a brand new specialty is that it has a high false-positive rate,” the source said. “They were kicking out a lot of people who subjectively appeared qualified.”

– Tony Bertuca

The Leavenworth Diary:
Double Agent Anthropologist Inside the Human Terrain System

by John Allison

They did not foresee that the Internet would be used as a revelatory tool by the global community to bypass and challenge all the dominant information streams leaders had previously used to govern, command, fight, buy or sell. Nor did they anticipate the importance the Internet would come to play—and challenges it would present–in the global spread of war, commerce, trade and culture in and amongst the nations of the world.

With that backdrop it’s no surprise that America’s government/corporate leaders failed to prepare American troops for the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence the ill-advised development and fielding of programs like the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System/Bowman Expeditions (Mexico) as retro-fixes for institutional/cultural ignorance and arrogance.

Win the Hearts and Minds of Gluons, Photons and Bosons!

The Cyber Terrain is the next big enigma, never mind that many layers of the Human Terrain onion haven’t been peeled back and studied.  The Pentagon’s CYBERCOM and heavy weight contractors like Lockheed Martin are keen to get on with the cyber expeditionary task. For example, in March 2010, Lockheed Martin Human Terrain experts produced a paper titled Dynamic Data and Modeling Suite in which we learn the following:

“This paper presents the feasibility of a complete services suite for end-to-end systems integration of data and modeling services that is tailored for use by commanders, military advisors and intelligence analysts involved in Counter-insurgency Operations. Through the integration of existing and innovative technologies including automated harvesting of near real-time data from the cyber domain, the Dynamic Data and Modeling Services Suite will enable astute socio-cultural behavior exploration. The existing proof-of-concept fusion environment feeds its predictive behavior models with comprehensive human terrain data from dynamic sources [including social networks].

It is our assertion that Users desire new applications that capitalize on technological advancements in behavioral modeling and data integration in order to achieve maximum mission success in the irregular warfare environment. The existing Environment leverages these technological advancements to enable Users to ingest, manage, store and model human terrain intelligence that is essential to COIN operations. Future work to form the complete Suite will further increase model accuracy by harvesting and integrating online social networking data. This OSINT data is evolving into a pertinent, though largely untapped, source for near real-time behavioral information.”

The USA’s Great Cyber Leap Forward threatens to encumber the Internet and its many applications as well as usher in an era of censorship by US government and corporate interests.

If ever the Pentagon fields some type of Cyber Terrain System (CYBERCOM?), here’s hoping that it does not mirror the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System as initially designed and managed.

Back to the Human Terrain System

“The complaints are so numerous and of such a nature as to keep Colonel Hamilton [acting HTS program manager] from doing her job,” sources claimed. They indicated that there is an ongoing investigation into the activities of Jeff Bowden, a key member of the program. This has an ongoing, negative influence on the functioning of the HTS program. Rumors abound, they said, of Bowden’s biased hiring practices that favor his friends and former service branch.

“The Army’s Human Terrain System program has such a bad reputation that it is openly shunned by the Fort Leavenworth military community. Personnel in the program who have good reputations have been warned to get out before their reputations are ruined.”

Apparently, there are some 80 Equal Opportunity, Discrimination and Sexual Harassment (EEO) claims that remain open within the HTS program. According to sources, “Poor management can be recognized by the way an organization treats its employees. The many complaints reflect failed leadership.” They allege that Bowden and other members of the HTS management team–who are/were McNeil, AECOM employees—are at the receiving end of some of these complaints.

As incredible as it seems, sources report that “people hide in their offices to avoid Bowden’s relentless prodding for oaths of allegiance to him and his insistence on attacking past or current employees who speak out against his poor leadership style.” They also allege that “He [Bowden] uses his government position to conduct character assassinations. He has asked many of us to give him statements slandering present and past employees. And when we refuse he adds us to his hit list and asks our fellow employees to make statements about our performance.”

Sources claim that Bowden’s “Training Redesign” is shallow and completely irrelevant. “It was developed in a vacuum with the input of just a few subcontractors [McNeil-AECOM] and the highest paid instructor in the program who continually receives the lowest student rating.”

Observers said this was “by design as it allows Bowden the freedom to make sweeping changes to the curriculum without full disclosure of the impact?

The Fort Polk Solution

Sources report that the HTS curriculum review/redesign is almost complete.  Some though, are unsure whether what is being proposed in the review/redesign will actually assist the program or make it worse.

“And what is the great training solution that will save the program? Ship the trainees to Fort Polk in Louisiana to take part in the eight week Foreign Security Forces Combat Advisor training program. If you think hiring has been tough in the past, try convincing a 40 something anthropologist to go to Fort Polk. Will this contribute to the integration of the team into a Brigade, Division or the Corps?”

The Combat Advisor Training seems to be a good idea. Providing some hard-core CAT for trainees before they deploy and attempting to simulate the dangerous environment they will be operating in makes sense. Still, observers see an Achilles Heel. “The real challenge is the first week at the beginning of the training. Personnel security, health and administrative requirements to meet deployment must be 100 percent complete.  Trouble is the HTS program has never been 100% on personnel for deployment. In fact there have been several issues in the completion of the background investigations and rumors of changing or altering records to improve students’ profiles and provide a gateway to classified material.”

Observers said there are other issues with the Fort Polk Solution. By sending the teams to the eight weeks of training at Fort Polk they are out-of-sight and out-of-mind; basically pushed down the road. They say they “don’t have to listen to them whine and complain about how they are treated.”

HTS trainees will spend ten weeks in Fort Leavenworth and the eight weeks at Fort Polk. After that they go directly into theater wherever they are needed.

Observers say that “Fort Polk is a projection platform. Pass go, collect $100 and into country. No time off or family contact.”

Sources report that there are five members of the {HTS] program who are actually going to go through the training and, once completed, provide their assessments to upper management. They are “all white males” said sources echoing complaints that HTS management is not a big fan of diversity.

Some believe that the Fort Polk Solution will “kill the HTS program.”

Cyber Terrain Meets Human Terrain-COIN-HTS

In 2009, social scientists were asked by the U.S. government to help Cyber Warriors understand the Cyber Terrain. Cyber Terrain offensive and defensive strategies and tactics have been discussed for decades* now but in 2010 there is a treasure trove of government cash available to public and private interests, CYBERCOM among them, to keep the cyber world open for business and military operations. It is likely that the world will soon learn about Cyber Terrain Teams operating in accordance with some sort of Cyber Counterinsurgency warfare doctrine not dissimilar to those developed by each of the major uniformed services.

Of course, this means that gigabytes of propaganda will appear promoting a new Cyber Cold War that pits West against East. Rather than the “cultural turn”, it’ll be the “cyber turn.” Who knows who will become the General David Petraeus of the Cyber COIN world?

At any rate, Cryptome recently posted a transcript from the Hearing on Agency Response to Cyberspace Policy Review, 16 June 2009, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, Committee on Science and Technology. During that hearing, Congressman Daniel Lipinski opined that “We need a cultural change in the way Americans practice their computer hygiene. Computer scientists need to team with social scientists to gain a better understanding of how humans interact with and utilize technology.”

“Human terrain knowledge deficiencies exist at all command echelons,” says the U.S. Army’s retooled Human Terrain System website.

Now it’s “Cyber Terrain deficiencies exist at all command echelons.”

Is this task beyond U.S. Army capabilities?

Jack Wittman and Kristin Quinn of the C4ISR Journal reported on Colonel Sharon Hamilton’s remarks at the 10^th Annual C4ISR Journal Conference.  Hamilton is the current U.S. Army Human Terrain System Director and former Director of Concepts Development at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca.

According to Wittman and Quinn, Hamilton indicated that “there is no accepted framework in the military or academia for analyzing socioeconomic, cultural considerations… Our data is non-structured…Our data has quality and is very rarely quantitative…How do we understand the people that we’re operating with and among? We have to understand what they’re motivated by and what they want.”

They reported that Hamilton asked defense industrial base contractors at the event for help in building a knowledge base that would allow HTS information to be easily stored and shared with all users along with a modeling and simulation system for scenario-based training.

“We need a way to bring that training very realistically to our soldiers before deploying… We need to set in their minds the stress level, the complexities they will face in theater.”

Hamilton’s remarks seem to promote the Training Brain concept as envisioned/practiced at JTCOIC, the Joint Training Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC). Her comments would seem to indicate an admission by U.S. Army TRADOC that training within HTS is poor and needs to be reworked yet again  JTCOIC’s purpose is to rectify shortcomings in traditional paper-based, classroom training by employing immersive modeling/simulation programs that include the latest data from US combat zones around the globe. According to the US Army’s 2010 Posture Statement:

“Through its creation of the Training Brain, the JTCOIC has had a profound impact on replicating the operational environment. Existing data at training centers was inadequate, both in volume and content, to support the training environment. The pre-deployment exercises were composed of hand-scripted significant activity reports as background to develop the scenario presented to a rotational unit. Units worked through these reports in short order and were left wanting for additional data (and reporting) that did not exist. Because of its mission in the counter IED fight the JTCOIC has access to today’s operational data, including the most current changes to our adversary’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. As the hub of the Training Brain, the JTCOIC has developed a way to bend that data to replicate the operational environment. It then integrates it across multiple platforms to provide an unprecedented depth to training scenarios and a common framework for centers and schools. Using an enterprise approach, the JTCOIC engages government, industry and academic partners to analyze emerging threats and create innovative solutions.

“Through the operational integration of training, intelligence analysis, and technology, the JTCOIC enables units to employ Army, Joint, and interagency capabilities to conduct operations to defeat IED networks and other emerging asymmetric threats…The JTCOIC continues to expand its ability to replicate the operational environment by integrating data from the Human Terrain System (HTS) into its operational and knowledge framework. Employing the power and reach of its extensive information technology architecture, JTCOIC supports the understanding and replication of the operational environment for application across all Joint and TRADOC core competencies. This has included the creation of the Training Brain which is designed to take actual events from current operations and overlay them on the terrain on which units are training at the combat training centers.

About Time!

This comes not a moment too soon as recent reports indicate that HTS training (and recruiting) continue to plague the program. Apparently, sources indicate this reflects poorly on Jeff Bowden who oversees HTS training and the HTS Director who has “lost control or never had it” said a source.

According to another source, “You’ll love this. How about posting people who have already been to Immersion Training for one country to an entirely different country?  Perhaps if the Human Resources Director for the program had ever been in either of the warzones, she would be able to make competent decisions. They are still short of Social Scientists, so much so that the June Class ended up with none and the program had to jump July students forward.”

Other sources indicate that, “Students voiced great concern that there is no training that prepares them for their future assignments. The Sensing Sessions were held prior to the Terminal Learning Event so the real complaints about the training program would not be measured by any real training. In one of the Sensing Sessions, a student with extensive military experience said that after nine weeks of training only four or five days were worth the time.”

Observers complained that the “three week Research Methods Course is of no value except to make the contractor rich.”

Apparently, one HTS principal had to admit himself into a hospital for stress, “after weeks–actually 2+ years without out any results–of nonsense trying to redesign the program.”

“Success is just around the corner, they say. We just need a little more money,” said one source.

“Just when we thought there was light at the end of the tunnel,” said another source.

Much more remarkable, and coming from a supposedly professional journalist who embedded with the U.S. Army in order to tag along with several Human Terrain Team members, is this series from The Virginian-Pilot by Joanne Kimberlin. What she loses in honesty and credibility she more than makes up for in her cheer-leading for a Human Terrain System in deep disrepute and disarray. Her work also proves why taking a “balanced” approach to our critiques is a worthless endeavor, as she cynically misappropriates certain revelations made only on this site, that she finds amenable to painting a positive lacquer on HTS. We now need to be the real balance once again, and the only way to do that is by being as skeptical and critical as possible.

PART ONE

Pulp: Framing HTS within the genre of war-related action/adventure is tried, tested, and yet still popular with American readers, if one takes the production of such fictions as answering some demand. We have seen this before with HTS, when it was written about here. Here we begin with Part 1, “New weapon in an old war:”

[Kimberlin:] “Boom! Heads snap toward the blast….No one speaks. Nothing moves – except salty trickles of sweat that seep from beneath helmets. There! From the other side of the mud-brick village, a plume of black smoke boils into an empty blue sky…. “That,” one says quietly, “was Afghanistan.”

Boom! Patriotic readers snap into formation. That was Afghanistan—a curious use of the past tense. Boom! That is not America. America makes no sound at all as it occupies what was Afghanistan.

“The idea: fewer bullets, more brains.” Brains—the zombie metaphor beckons yet again. It’s about brains, brains will save America from this morass. We need more articles about brains, to get Americans thinking about thinking, instead of ejaculating about bombing.

“The Human Terrain System embeds civilian scholars with combat units to help outsmart the insurgency….anthropologists and other social scientists delve into the population, which the military now dubs “the human terrain.”

They are outsmarting the insurgency—I see—more Afghan than the Afghans now, are they? Well not really, just license on the part of the pulp fiction writer, the reality is more mundane: “Insight into the customs and history of the people could help troops avoid the kind of blunders that make it tough to gain traction in Afghanistan.” Tour guides.

It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea… It’s a Good Idea…

The idea, that HTS is a good idea, is repeated throughout. Kimberlin writes, “for all the problems and controversy, one big question persists: In a long war short on answers, could HTS be one that works?” She then interviews Col. Steve Fondacaro for her answer, as she does consistently: asking those employed with the program, and those with personal reputations tied to the program’s public image, to speak about the value of the program. Fondacaro, for his part, cannot seem to give an answer without doing further damage: to Kimberlin he complains about President Obama firing General Stanley McChrystal, for his vulgar and public insubordination. Fondacaro thinks the firing “was really petty,” and praises his former classmate for his indiscretion: “Stan’s always been a straight shooter.” (Even, it seems, when he shoots himself in the foot.)

Kimberlin makes a plea for extending the war effort, betraying her role as military stenographer: “We’ve been here before and seen what happens when we just pack up and leave….Once the Russians were gone, we lost interest.” But, there has to be an end in sight, and here she is more careful to align herself with Obama’s foreign policy: “Still, no one wants us to stay forever. An armed occupation, well-intentioned or not, eventually wears out its welcome. Every wayward drone, every ham-fisted house search, every wrong squeeze of the trigger creates new enemies.”

News?

Kimberlin offers us very few revelations about HTS, apart from a handful scattered across the four articles. In this first one, she helps to confirm what we already understood, thanks to her interview with Fondacaro: “Funding would come from the Department of Defense, but, Fondacaro says, every dollar required a dog fight in the competition-heavy military machine.” As part of that dog fight, a media blitz, of which this series itself is a residual artifact, having been started and prepared before Fondacaro and McFate were removed from HTS.

Mystery Critics

The treatment of critics is minor and brusque, opting to render them homogeneous and nameless. Human Terrain Team members, on the other hand, get extended personal treatment, are named, and shown to have diverse views. Part of the bulk criticisms from nameless critics has been aimed at Fondacaro’s leadership—here Kimberlin writes: “Personally, Fondacaro has taken a lot of heat. He’s been called a ‘mad man,’ a ‘war profiteer’ and an ‘idiot’.” In the fourth article in the series Fondacaro says even he hated himself after reading John Stanton’s articles.

Paula Loyd: Blonde

Finally, in this first installment, a few words about those who died while working for HTS. Standing out again is Paula Loyd—and note the lead description: “Loyd was an outgoing, 36-year-old blonde with a long history of aid work.” What does her having blonde hair have to do with anything? Why even bother mentioning it, when the hair colour of the other dead HTS people is not mentioned? Because it matters to Americans, as a cultural icon, as symbolic of the superior White Anglo-Saxon Protestant. She was outgoing—she went too far. A long history of aid work—and no mention of the even longer history spent in the military. Hear that bell ring? An angel in fatigues just earned her wings.

PART TWO

In Part 2, “American muscle proves futile in land of extremes,” Kimberlin continues the main theme: “The Hampton Roads-based Human Terrain System is one attempt to wage smarter war. HTS embeds civilian scholars with troops in the battle zone, where it’s their job to decipher the complex cultural landscape that allows the militants to maintain their stubborn toe hold.” Keep these in mind: complex cultural landscape—decipher—smarter war. The value of HTS is a matter the interviewees all insist upon, never demonstrate—here a soldier says “They start from a vantage point that’s strictly about the people and what they think. That’s invaluable. Anybody who can help us get a piece in the puzzle is an add.”

Later in the article, this out of place statement, concerning “criticism that its scholars aren’t qualified to give local insight. ‘They’ve got Ph.D.s,’ Fondacaro says. ‘They’re smart people. They can learn’.” This complex cultural landscape, so complex it must be deciphered, can be apprehended by just about any foreigner who is air dropped into Afghanistan without prior experience, without facility in local languages—but they can learn, because they have credentials. Are they then saying that ordinary soldiers, some with multiple “tours” of Afghanistan, are just too stupid to learn?

Again With the Critics

About those critics—Kimberlin notes: “Anthropologists working for HTS are defying their profession. Last December, the American Anthropological Association condemned the program, wary that its scholarly findings might be used by the military to target the enemy, a breech of the field’s ‘do no harm’ code of ethics. The association also takes a dim view of its own members becoming casualties.” Even this brief element draws no direct response from anyone she interviews. Instead, we hear that

“the backlash has helped turn Fondacaro and his academic counterpart, Montgomery McFate, into lightning rods. Bloggers have vilified the pair, accusing them of all sorts of shadowy deeds, including bilking the taxpayers and recklessly endangering lives.”

Who are these mysterious, nameless bloggers? That doesn’t matter, as we are told about McFate that, “She doesn’t bother to read any of the blogs about HTS, where she’s described as a ‘hustler,’ a ‘poisonous individual’ and ‘the crazy aunt in the room’.” Too bad she doesn’t read “them” …because those are statements made from people who served in HTS.

Wait…did McFate tell Kimberlin that she doesn’t read any of the blogs?

“But her jaw sets at some of the personal attacks in journals or anthropology blogs — not the accusations of intellectual prostitution, but claims that she is motivated by greed.” (source)

Oops. Kimberlin’s research is selective: she “missed” that piece, but not another: without attribution she recycled some of the material about Fondacaro from The Men’s Journal article written by Robert Young Pelton, particularly the part (see Part 1 of the series) where Fondacaro breaks his jaw during an interview with RYP.

Meet Mac the Mercenary: Second-in-Charge

Any new revelations in Part 2? Not many, except that a former mercenary is now in charge of HTS in Afghanistan, someone who goes by the name of “Mac:” “He first came to Afghanistan in 2003 as a security contractor on the Ring Road…. He joined HTS in November 2008 and worked his way up to second-in-charge in Afghanistan.”

Also, the number of Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan: “Two-thirds of the 30 HTS teams are now embedded with the military in Afghanistan.”

Finally, the only HTS member I met in person, Christopher King, is now in Afghanistan: “Chris King, an anthropologist from Ohio, is on an HTS team assigned to ISAF. Reserved and bookish, King does not leave ‘the wire,’ as the perimeter of the base is known. It’s his job to supply ‘theater wide’ cultural insight to the host of generals and colonels who make up the high command.” One of the few anthropologists they get—not that he had any expertise on Afghanistan—and they have him perform in the role of armchair anthropologist. One of his valuable discoveries is that Afghans are a lot like Americans. They hate outsiders imposing on them.

PART THREE

In Part 3, “Building trust amid fear, one mission at a time,” we are introduced to a few more HTS members, most notably Amy Bursell, Patrick Flanagan, and Chris Fitz, only the first being an academic—and we are also introduced to the “mission monkey:”

Oh Goody! The Mission Monkey is Here!

“Amy Bursell climbs out of a bulletproof car in front of an Afghan police station. Strapped to the back of her flak vest: the Mission Monkey, a stuffed animal she brings along for nearly every meeting with the locals. Patrick Flanagan rolls his eyes: ‘I hate that stupid monkey. I mean hate.’ Bursell, 38, is a talkative social scientist from Alexandria. Flanagan, 43, is a conservative Army reserve colonel from Manassas. ‘The monkey helps break the ice,’ Bursell says firmly. ‘It lets people know I’m not a soldier’.”

When meeting with Afghan elders, what does Bursell do? Please tell us she doesn’t take out her stuffed toy and wiggle it in their faces! We are not told how she uses it. It seems to be her outward way of symbolizing that she is a civilian…but then again, we are told later that she carries a gun. I would like to suggest that the mission monkey here is not the one on the back of the flak vest; it’s the one wearing the vest.

It gets worse—“Radios have been synced, and call signs are being chosen for the two hardened SUVs that will carry the team into town. Bursell suggests ‘Muppet One’ and ‘Muppet Two’.” Either Bursell is having a tough time outgrowing an American infancy fed on a diet of incessant television, or, her psychological tactic involves lowering everyone else to the level of children.

One thing about Bursell, as an expert required to provide advice and insight on the basis of her sensitivity to locals, is that she has learned to tune the locals out: “All eyes watch as she and the Mission Monkey weave their way through a group of men in a garage outside the police station. ‘They’re mostly just curious,’ she says. ‘At first it makes you feel pretty weird, but now I just try to ignore it.’

Bursell “tries not to think about the fact that three HTS social scientists have been killed on the job,” Kimberlin tells us. Bursell says: “My parents thought I was crazy to come here. But I just find it really stimulating.” Really stimulating—yes, indeed, it’s all about me and my personal gratification.

European Luxury and West Virginia Savages

Camp Marmal, where this particular Human Terrain Team is based,

“is an oasis of European civilization. It features a cozy atrium with bistros and socializing. Fresh herbs grow in pots outside comfortable barracks. There’s even an indoor badminton court, earning the base the nickname of Club Med.”

Like their Soviet predecessors, this new crop of colonials has learned that the good life is to be had in the colonies. “Bursell feels fortunate to be assigned to such a cushy post.” Reports are that her mission monkey can be heard cooing with pleasure.

What about Afghanistan…beyond that oasis of European herbs and badminton? HTS member Chris Fitz “says the country reminds him of West Virginia: ‘They’re conservative, religious and they like their guns’.” But do they like headcheese sandwiches and banjos?

Take it Easy: We Just Supply the Information that Kills

Patrick Flanagan “dismisses the frowns of social scientists back home who accuse HTS of supplying ‘mercenary anthropology’ that the military could use to hunt down and kill the opposition, a violation of the field’s neutral pledge to the subjects it studies. ‘We provide information,’ Flanagan says. ‘We can’t be responsible for what the commander does with that information’.”

A remarkable statement: he confesses to irresponsible complicity, and confesses to the fact that some of the information is used for targeting.

Dishonest Use of Wikileaks References

Where any remaining veneer of honesty cracks and falls off Joanne Kimberlin is when she raises the issue of what was found in Wikileaks about HTS. As it happens, it was this very site—which she does not name—that did the research about HTS in Wikileaks, and the only site to have written about that aspect. In the first contribution we made, we extracted all of the records dealing with HTS; second, we dealt with some of the problems surrounding the records’ release, and to what extent they can be counted on as useful; third—and this is the only piece on which Kimberlin bases her irresponsible, dishonest, and deliberately propagandistic claims—we talked, ironically, about how Wikileaks’ records could be used to construct a positive gloss for HTS, not realizing anyone would be incompetent enough to single out that information and do so without question—but then again, we didn’t know Kimberlin existed back then; and, fourth, the really critical piece that Kimberlin and the rest of the media continue to choose to ignore.

Instead, Kimberlin lazily plonks down these words, again without attribution, hoping that readers are lazy and gullible and will do no searches of their own:

“The program cropped up dozens of times in the Afghan War Diaries, the reams of insider documents posted by Wikileaks this summer. According to the entries, HTS has helped uniforms understand clans and disputes, assess loyalties, and figure out that construction supervisors were siphoning off money and police were stealing from households.”

Remember 9/11 When I Run for Congress

Patrick Flanagan has political ambitions, he reveals. No doubt these factored into what otherwise seemed like a sloppy and all-too-fast invocation of 9/11: “And if it’s useful to help us win the war on terror, then that’s good, yes? Do you forget 9/11?”

No, don’t ever, ever, let them forget 9/11. Flanagan “plans to run for Congress in his Northern Virginia district in 2014.” For which party? “Republican…of course.”

PART FOUR

Part 4, “In the enemy’s lair, fighting for Afghanistan’s future,” is more interesting for what it tells us about Fondacaro, even though it contains a few notes about two HTS members, Patrick Carnahan and Brian Ericksen.

The one person finally named who is a critic of HTS management, John Stanton, gets an ironic swipe from Kimberlin: “Stanton’s articles lean on mostly unnamed sources.” That is better than using other people’s published material without even token attribution, and I know and have relied on some of those sources and they demand anonymity.

The problem, as identified by Kimberlin, is that,

“Bad press can bring heat from above. A congressional review of HTS has been ordered by the House Armed Services Committee. A senior staffer on the committee described the inquiry as mostly routine but acknowledged that it’s partially propelled by the criticism. ‘The bosses don’t like complaints,’ Fondacaro says.”

Kimberlin updates her article to take into account more recent events, speaking of what we now know was the outright firing of Steve Fondacaro: “His boss at the Training and Doctrine Command gave him 24 hours to turn in his government-issued gear and clear out. ‘I gave him a chance to resign and he refused,’ said Maxie McFarland, the man who hired Fondacaro four years ago.” McFarland says the firing had nothing to do with the detractors or the congressional review: “Steve did a great job standing up the program, but his skills are not the right ones to carry it to the next level.” Sure, we get it.

And Fondacaro gets it too: “I’m the toad in the road,” he says quietly. “In personal terms, I’m absolutely pissed off.”

Finally, the message is repeated again, in ever simpler terms (you do this when you think your readership consists of imbeciles and children): “HTS is part of a new strategy that puts as much emphasis on shoring up the good guys as it does on destroying the bad. Cultural insight is now considered as crucial as high-powered weaponry.”

The good guys, versus the bad guys. This is contemporary American journalism.

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

I had the opportunity in the past months, to be involved in the Army’s controversial Human Terrain Teams program that was the brain child of a retired colonel and struggling anthropologist. It is all about making as much money as possible for selves and cronies, and the training in my view will get a few more starry-eyed team members killed, before congress pulls the plug.

The program is choc-full of civilian misfits and prima donnas who have never set foot outside their hometowns, oh sorry, some had had the opportunity of travelling as students or tourists to some third world countries, and so they were the experts. Others had read a book or two on terrorism (apologists’ books), whereupon these social scientists, research managers and even analysts, would argue vociferously about how America was in the wrong and Islam was really a religion of peace. When asked if they had read the Koran, or ever really lived in a Muslim country, these pathetic civilians looked sheepish and usually had this brilliant response, “What does that have to do with it!”

It gets better, one of the team leaders (they all had to be at least a Major and up in the army) had spent a short tour in Afghanistan and claimed the Pashtoons had always talked about family to him, and so my recommendation that talking about a Pashtoon’s womenfolk was a big no no, was rebutted with “that’s not true”.

Asked if he had shown pictures of his wife and daughters to the locals, the answer was “Of course.” Nice! Now asked if the locals had shown him pictures of their wives, and daughters – “Eh, what does that have to do with it!”

“Nothing, oh nothing, and I bet they (the women) had been introduced to you no? You mean you never even got to know their names, and only saw them as living shrouds, and …”

“Look, I just got back from a tour there, and those are their customs. They are illiterate, short, smelly guys, and not the brightest people in the world.” And these are the guys, team leaders, who will be leading teams of anthropologists, social scientists etc in Iraq and Afghanistan – teams which are supposed to be winning hearts and minds for us!

Most of the colonels in the program were a pleasure to be with, especially Mark, but then the retired colonel in charge of overseeing the program with the holier than thou title of “Seminar Leader” was the most officious ass you could ever come across, under whose watch those with the most to offer the program with language and cultural skills, were let go. No wonder we are in the situation we are in, in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Even after the killings of a few members of these ill-trained teams, it seems the powers that be are totally inept at understanding the need for truth in training and learning from their mistakes. This is truly a case of the blind leading the blind, the thieves laughing all the way to the bank, and Mr. and Ms. taxpayer getting screwed again.

Also, a comment posted on this blog states: “…last week a team from HTT was involved in a complex IED attack and NOTHING was reported. Injured was Mike Warren a deputy program manager. There were no casualties but there were many njuries and no report on the severity.”

If more is made known, we will post updates here.

1. Human Terrain Teams in Wikileaks’ Afghan War Diary: Raw Data
2. Wikileaks’ Afghan War Diary: Problems to Note, More to Come on Human Terrain Teams
3. Human Terrain System in Wikileaks’ Afghan War Diary: Searching for Evidence of the Positive

At the end of the second article, I wrote about the Human Terrain System getting its worst walloping yet as a result of these seemingly banal little records, and I added: “the [HTS] program managers should be going into serious damage control mode right now and preparing their own public statement, given evidence now in plain view right on this screen. They see it, and they know precisely what we mean.” Instead, they seem to be playing it cool, waiting to see who knows what they think they know, and who is willing to be the first to say it, instead of releasing any official statements. Perhaps current senior HTS insiders misunderstood the direction that debate would take, and decided to do this, which is to speak about civilian casualties and the impact on winning hearts and minds, but we are told that Major Robert Holbert, a member of the first Human Terrain Team to serve in Afghanistan, “couldn’t get Army clearance to answer questions Monday” –presumably that means questions beyond those he did in fact answer. It is unfortunate, because he is intimately familiar with what follows.

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In Plain View: Getting the Intelligence From HTTs

When a Human Terrain Team (HTT) is mentioned in the records leaked to Wikileaks, how does the report writer know what he or she knows about the HTT? The answer seems simple enough, in a number of instances: a HTT is embedded with a larger military unit, the report writer indicates where the HTT is, what it is doing at a given moment, and what it plans to do. As for what HTTs themselves report, none of these records are HTT reports. Their reports go elsewhere and have an altogether different form–some have been uploaded to this site’s document box (here is one recent example), and you can see new ones being released at Public Intelligence. So when a record indicates what was recorded by a member or members of a HTT, how does the report writer know that, and who are these report writers?

In some instances, the writers of the reports providing HTT information are in military intelligence. They are either S-2, where an S-2 is a battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (in an Army or Marine Corps battalion or regiment), or they are HUMINT (Human Intelligence) operatives, and you can read about HUMINT in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual and elsewhere.

Before going further, and to better understand the significance of this part, one must keep in mind here the many instances in the American Anthropological Association’s final report on HTS (by the Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities) where it was explained that,

“the [HTS] program is housed within a DoD intelligence asset…it has reportedly been briefed as such an asset, and…a variety of circumstances of the work of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) ‘on the ground’ in Iraq and Afghanistan create a significant likelihood that HTS data will in some way be used as part of military intelligence, advertently or inadvertently” (p. 4).

In a written response to the AAA’s queries, HTS’ Montgomery McFate stated:

“Protection of informant confidentiality is strongly emphasized because insurgent groups may target local Iraqis and Afghanis [sic] if proper measures for securing identity are not maintained. HTTs code their notes, store them securely, and sanitize their information to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.” (p. 33)

Even a recent job ad for a HTS Research Manager states about HTTs: “The teams will not engage in combat missions, nor does it [sic] collect intelligence.”

The AAA report also revealed the following, and I quote from it at length because it has now received further validation from these leaked reports, as we shall see:

The suggestion is that in practice the relationship between unclassified or open data collection and intelligence collection, especially in the field or downrange, is very close and that the two are perhaps hopelessly entangled. Or, as one observer put it, “Everyone talks to everyone else out here.” (p. 38)

Insofar as we are aware, currently there is no known mechanism for “feeding” raw data from HTS to the intelligence community [MF: this must now be revised, given what follows]. At the same time…on the ground the differences between HTS-type data collection and intelligence gathering are unclear within HTTs (p. 38)

While HTS spokespersons have consistently claimed that HTS personnel and data has not been used for the targeting of enemy populations, at least some statements by HTS social scientists support critics claims that HTS data can be utilized for such ends (p. 38)

the likelihood that HTTs can work closely with both military and civilian colleagues but also remain well clear of pressures – either direct or once or twice removed – to generate any cultural intelligence appears low. In fact the HTS public account dissociating it from any and all intelligence gathering runs contrary to a number of accounts from government insiders suggesting that the initial idea for some sort of human terrain program grew out of a growing recognition of the need to build up precisely that aspect of intelligence collection and analysis. (p. 39)

At least one deployed HTS social scientist was in fact physically located in the intelligence fusion center (p. 39)

That some of the records we read were written by intelligence personnel is one issue. More important is how they obtained the information “reported” by HTTs that we read in these reports.

In some cases, what we are reading is information “drawn” from actual, “raw” field notes, internally “leaked” by one or more HTT members to military intelligence. That is the mechanism by which raw data is fed to intelligence, that the AAA’s CEAUSSIC guessed about above. In case anyone is not following, we are dealing with one or more individuals in HTTs in Afghanistan who were intelligence analysts and who, without the knowledge or permission of fellow HTT members, copied their private field notes and put the information into the intelligence stream. This, I must emphasize, is not conjecture on my part, nor simply an “interpretation.” The evidence of this process has left its marks, as inscribed in various places throughout the leaked records provided by Wikileaks. HTS program managers, and their internal “leakers” to military intelligence, must have seen these reports for themselves by now, and see them in plain view, black on white. There is no denying them now, and focusing on John Stanton’s sourcing won’t cut it (and really, never did).

That such an internal spying program existed/exists, can only be with the knowledge and at least the tacit assent of both the higher ups in HTS–it is impossible that McFate and Fondacaro would not have known about it–and the military intelligence branches. This is a very grave violation of the confidentiality of HTT sources and their fieldnotes. It also suggests that the periodic noises that senior managers make about developing ethical guidelines, is meant as propaganda to assuage external critics, and to placate the consciences of its employees. Knowing this now, that this has happened and probably continues to happen, ought to tell those considering joining HTS that they are likely committing  career suicide, and that their best intentions and more noble aims will be subverted. A number of those who have been on the inside of course know about this already, and are aghast at what they are seeing online, but for some it may come as shocking news. The “line” between HTT and HUMINT is not just blurred, it is actively and surreptitiously breached.

This can have extremely grave ramifications, beyond the reputations and careers of HTT members, beyond the irreparably damaged public profile of HTS itself. As we heard already, while Col. Martin Schweitzer’s comments about HTTs helping to reduce lethal operations have received abundant air play in the media–what has apparently not been noticed (unless you watch that video) is the part at the end where he affirms that Special Operations Forces do rely on the products of HTTs. Apparently they can also rely on military intelligence partners to get them what they need, without HTT members having a chance to decide what information to convey and in what shape.

That the leaders of the Human Terrain System sit by silently, as these Wikileaks records unfold in public view, demonstrates a remarkably glacial indifference and stony demeanor.

Identifying Sympathies for the Enemy, Battlefield Interrogations, and HUMINT

On Haqqani’s Trail

“The Haqqani network may be a possible link between this town and Pakistan” was stated in a 31 July 2007 extract from HTT fieldnotes about the village of Kandaw Kalay in the Shwak District. Some will contend this is not targeting: targeting would require the name of the person, his location at a given time, how many civilians are around him, etc. It is targeting an entire village however, as a place of interest for Special Ops. In October of last year, that exact village was targeted in a raid (and one should note that the Wikileaks records did not help us to find that information). (I say “village” with some caution–it is hard to see what that place is from the record’s map location).

For U.S. forces operating in Regional Command East (RC East), tracking Haqqani and his network (noted as HQN in the records) is an obvious matter of urgent interest. Between 2006 and 2008, the Wikileaks records show at least four IED detonations targeting supply trucks in the Shwak District. On 31 August 2007 the report is that the HTT was able to gather the following information: “Hakani has a great influence in their area.” On 06 September 2007, in what is wrongly/misleadingly titled a “HTT Report,” but is instead another instance of lifting HTT members’ fieldnotes and putting them into the hands of intelligence, we read:

“ACM [anti-coalition militia] influence in Gerda Serai: Haqqani himself belongs to the Sultan Khel Tribe. Some of Haqqanis sons and many of his extended relatives are still reside in Gerda Serai. Gerda Serai is without a doubt, a Haqqani network stronghold. The Parangi tribe is also subject to strong Taliban influence, although the Parangi are not believed to share the Talibans ideology. They simply provide shelter and material support. Once OPN Khyber ends, it is believed that HQN and Taliban forces will return to the district in force.”

Channeling Information to Collection Management

“Information/intel flow from maneuver unit to CA/PRT to CMA” reads a line from a 25 August 2007 report, referring to a full team consisting of doctors, medics, a veterinarian, linguists, and a HTT, moving with members of Combined Joint Task Force 82 (CJTF-82) and a CMA team (“collection management”). Collection management is defined in the joint intelligence doctrine manual as “the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required” (source1, and see the US Air Force Intelligence Targeting Guide).

Locating Suicide Bombers

On 14 June 2008, a record dealing with a demonstration by Afghans in Zormat, a demonstration that is clearly causing some anxiety for U.S. forces, although we are not told what was the object of the demonstration, just that it was “non-hostile” (though that did not stop an Afghan policeman from killing a demonstrator and wounding five others). In what might have escalated into significant action, a HTT embedded with Task Force Panther is said to have “received reports of possible suicide bombers” around the area of a demonstration taking place in the bazaar.

Battlefield Interrogations

If HTTs are supposed to conduct battlefield interrogations, it’s not in their job descriptions. One wonders what training they receive for what is essentially an intelligence function, with very direct and immediate consequences for those interviewed. On 03 October 2007, Task Force Eagle (C Company) assisted members of the Afghan National Army, and their American mentors in an Embedded Training Team, in a firefight with “anti-coalition militia” that resulted in five wounded ANA troops, and one wounded ETT member. Three ANA trucks, and one ETT armoured vehicle were badly damaged. However, “later in the day, two fighting aged males showed up at FOB Orgun E with gun shot wounds.” They claimed they had been ambushed by the ANA, and apparently claimed to be non-combatants. The suspicious thing about their story is that members of the ETT and the ANA forces “reported there were no civilians at the ambush location.” These two individuals were treated for their wounds, and then escorted to Forward Operating Base Salerno for additional treatment.

What is important to note that is that an intelligence unit, “the Fury S-2 shop,” had the two Afghans interviewed by a HTT.

On 12 August 2009, a HTT found itself under direct fire, alongside combat troops of the 3-71 Cavalry Regiment “Titans” 10th Mountain Division, whose home base is in Fort Drum, New York. Fire came from a fortification that the record writer referred to as a “qalat.” Two F-16s were called in for an airstrike—which does not seem to have occurred. Two civilians, mistaken for enemy combatants, were wounded. One U.S. soldier was also wounded. There were no enemy casualties. We read: “Battle X reports 3/B is having HTT question 15 mams (MF: women?) that were in close vic (MF: vicinity) to burning qalat they took fire from. Also questioning 30-40 males in the village.” A human intelligence (HUMINT) collection team (HCT) was also present and conducting interviews. In fact, the report writes of the HTT and HCT as covering the exact same ground: interviewing the same people, in the same number.

A Revised Job Advertisement for HTS

Taking into account what we now know about the work of Human Terrain Teams, actual job ads for HTS ought to be drastically revised, in the interest of transparency, and to minimize the frequent conflicts in the consciences of their employees that have led many to walk out on the program, and quite a few to act as whistle blowers in their own right. Actual job ads have been revised, since HTS now uses a tool designed for the intelligence community, the TIGR (tactical ground reporting) unit made by Ascend Intelligence, which we previously talked about here. More needs to be said about how fieldnotes are not private and confidential, leaks are built into the program, the work of HTTs is destined for intelligence collectors, analysts, and Special Ops, and that they will be required to do battlefield interrogations, and occasionally expose themselves to grave bodily harm.

A Final Note?

Having said all of this, and speaking only for myself, I really cannot imagine how I would have anything further to write about the Human Terrain System, unless certain individuals decide to come out and speak out in public. John Stanton is likely to have more news reports, and more leaks, and those will get priority placement on this site, more than anything else I might have written. I had planned a few more posts, and have since dumped them: they were itsy-bitsy pieces of what now almost appear to be random trivia, not sewn together to amount to an explanatory and critical narrative as above, and adding little more than mass. As far as I am concerned, this is the turning point, just the beginning, as the head of the snake begins to devour its tail.

While it is true that this is largely “thanks” to Wikileaks and their source(s), there is also a great deal about this release that should provoke intense outrage, for having essentially produced a gigantic hit list, for which I voluntarily but unknowingly paid a sum. The “do no harm” principle has been utterly ignored by Wikileaks. I have much more to say about Wikileaks, not likely to appear on this site however. In the meantime, the only other anthropology blog to have discussed the Wikileaks records (that I know about), is Savage Minds, with another very good article by Zoe Wool at the University of Toronto–see: Raw and Cooked Facts in Wikileaks’ “Afghan War Diaries, 2004-2010.”

This is a very big moment in time, endlessly fascinating from any number of angles, and sure to leave a mark on our discussions about the Afghan war for some time to come. Countless newspaper narratives will be written on the basis of the Wikileaks reports; scholars will comb through them; and books will be written in whole or in part on the basis of these leaked records. Here I give some reasons to be a little less euphoric.

Before proceeding to the next posts, which will deal fully with the information on Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) in the Afghan War Diary, we need to clear some of the brush surrounding the release and what is contained in these documents overall. Julian Assange clearly believes that the release of these documents will somehow change the course of the war in Afghanistan and help to create a better informed citizenry that is more conscious of the realities of this war. For that, he relies on materials produced by the U.S. military, and that requires that citizens approach these documents with a critical perspective that is already at least partly formed. Others, instead, prefer to denounce the release in advance of knowing what is contained, declaring the American(s) who leaked the reports guilty of treason, and citing those non-Americans involved in its release as enemies of the U.S. That is patriotism and in this instance it is opposed to knowledge. Assange also believes the focus will be on the atrocities committed by U.S. and other NATO forces, and there is substantial evidence of that in these documents.

Which Bastards?

When asked by Larry King on Monday, 26 July, who he meant to call “bastards” when he told Der Spiegel “I enjoy crushing bastards,” Assange specified he meant U.S. forces. Assange must also believe that those studying these documents will not focus as much on the atrocities committed by the Taleban, such as the devastating carnage caused by their IEDs and suicide bombers, and their apparent disregard for the scores of civilians that are killed as a result of going after one target with a massive bomb–The Guardian, with what is arguably the best coverage of the three newspapers to have obtained the documents a month in advance of their public release, has already covered this aspect quite quickly. In these same reports, the Taleban appear to be using hammers to kill mosquitoes. Left at that level of discussion, we have data, but not much understanding–for example, of why the Taleban have nonetheless gained strength and support, or why we may view their deadly attacks as something for which the U.S. and NATO share partial responsibility, for having overthrown and persecuted the Taleban after invading and occupying their country, thereby provoking a hostile and asymmetric reaction. It would be a silly or wicked person who would argue that Afghans have no right to fight back.

While I generally agree with Assange’s sentiments, to the extent that they are knowable, I do not share his optimism about the impact of these documents. Information is not power, and it is not meaning. To make sense of these documents requires interpretation and argumentation that goes beyond and outside the limits of what are, after all, reports reflective of an American optic, produced by combatants. Source criticism and cross checking will be paramount, and to the extent that is not done, Wikileaks may witness members of the public using the same documents to not only bolster the arguments to support continuation of this war, but even an escalation to direct hostilities with Iran (see The Guardian, and see the justified alarm expressed by Marc Lynch at Foreign Policy). There is also debate between The Guardian and The New York Times over the extent to which the reports can be trusted when it comes to Pakistan’s supposed role in aiding the Taleban and conducting covert operations against the government of Afghanistan and western forces–that dispute happened within the first day of reporting on the documents, and disagreement over their credibility did not stop the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan from verbally thrashing each other in public, again within 24 hours of the documents’ release. These reports overall contain enough to hurt those who are critics of U.S. foreign policy, as much as they will hurt those who support it. They contain as much potential for escalating and expanding conflict, as they contain for mobilizing popular support to stop it. I also understand that my commentary here may well be premature, but then so are all the current commentaries.

What Should Matter to Social Scientists?

To bring this discussion closer to the concerns of anthropologists and social scientists generally, there are a few points that I feel need to be made. One concerns the extent to which these records are only a partial selection of all records produced by the U.S. military. That is a significant problem, because we cannot know if the items excluded would in some way modify any conclusions we reach about the records we have. Wikileaks received a total of about 110,000 records, and released about 92,000. It is hard to believe that a period covering six years of war could have produced only this amount. To my knowledge, Julian Assange has not been asked any questions about this issue. We therefore also do not know why these records were included and others excluded. This issue will come up again when I speak about what the records reveal about the workings of the Human Terrain System.

A second problem, and it is a major one, concerns Assange’s assertions that the items were redacted to minimize the risk of harm to the sources indicated in the records. From what we have seen already, just with reference to Human Terrain Teams alone and their sources, that is completely untrue. There is no evidence whatsoever of any kind of redaction. Moreover, when one deletes information for a record, one is supposed to mark the text in some way to say either “name deleted” or “sentence deleted,” etc., and I see no evidence of that. In addition, who comprises Wikileaks’ team of redactors, and on the basis of what knowledge and expertise, as either war fighters, or people with experience and knowledge of Afghanistan, could they make calls about what was “harmless” versus “harmful” information? Which specialists did they consult, and for how long did they have the records to study? Not a word about this, merely bland and general assurances.

Indeed, Assange’s statements about Wikileaks’ “harm minimization process” seem to only focus on the safety of his “bastards,” noting that the documents “do not generally cover top-secret operations” and that they “delayed the release of some 15,000 reports” as “demanded by our source” (source). This is an exchange Assange had with Der Spiegel on this issue:

SPIEGEL: The material contains military secrets and names of sources. By publishing it, aren’t you endangering the lives of international troops and their informants in Afghanistan?

Assange: The Kabul files contain no information related to current troop movements. The source went through their own harm-minimization process and instructed us to conduct our usual review to make sure there was not a significant chance of innocents being negatively affected. We understand the importance of protecting confidential sources, and we understand why it is important to protect certain US and ISAF sources [emphasis added].

SPIEGEL: So what, specifically, did you do to minimize any possible harm?

Assange: We identified cases where there may be a reasonable chance of harm occurring to the innocent. Those records were identified and edited accordingly.

A third problem has to do with source criticism, source confirmation, and Assange’s call for crowdsourcing. Anthropologists should relate to this issue personally. Imagine that someone gets hold of your fieldnotes, and releases a part of them. No analysis, no contextualization, no doubts about the veracity of what an informant told you is in those notes. They are released, and then members of a broad public take hold of their interpretation, and take what is reported as the truth of a situation. Wouldn’t this make you freak out? Are any of our books and journal articles a mere transcription of our fieldnotes? So who is this “crowd” that will make solid arguments from these notes? How will they check their veracity? Do they know who wrote these reports, under what conditions, under what limitations, and with what motivations? Will they travel to Afghanistan and cover the ground covered by these military units? What other documents will they use to confirm these reports, or will they trust them blindly? These are already some of the issues being raised about the alleged Iran-Al Qaeda connection, and Pakistan’s role in supporting the Taleban.

I will stop here, and in the next posts get to the issues of what these records contain when it comes to the work of Human Terrain Teams, what they do not contain, what helps make a positive case for the Human Terrain System, and what may be the worst walloping yet to hit HTS. Indeed, the program managers should be going into serious damage control mode right now and preparing their own public statement, given evidence now in plain view right on this screen. They see it, and they know precisely what we mean.

RC EAST: (EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) INTERDICTION RPT (PBIED) : 0 INJ/DAM
Child suicide bomber. June 2 2007 an Afghan official approached an HTT and reported that a child was used as a suicide bomber . The Taliban put a bomb vest on the boy and told him to go to the District Center amd when you get there just push the switch. The boy confused when he arrived at the District Center, told an unnamed official at the center that he was asked to go tehre and push the switch that he carried. The official promptly disarmed the boy. The unnamed child was allegedly an orphan and was taking care of himself but had limmited help from others. The Afghan indicated that this was typical of the Taliban to target orphans to become suicide bombers. There were other villigars who in separate interviews ve rified the same story.
Report key: 1030302
Tracking number: 1030302
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: DRUID – ISAF
Unit name:
Type of unit: ACM
Originator group: DRUID – ISAF
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SUB710229
CCIR:
Sigact: DColor: RED
Affiliation ENEMY
Type Explosive Hazard
Category Interdiction
Date 2007-06-02 00:12

RC EAST: 021200Z TF 2 Fury TALIBAN USES ORPHAN AS SUICIDE BOMBER
The HTT Cell was tasked to interview local nationals during a shura given by Governor Pathan at the Miri Boys School . The HTTs mission was to gauge the participating villagers reaction to the Governor and other speakers speeches and identify possible future metrics for measuring the influence of similar future events. During the investigation it was brought to their attention that a young boy was used a in attempted suicide attack on the event but detained by a local official. The attached report covers the events surrounding the incident.
Report key: 7C5FF9FF-4D9E-4995-83D1-E3A4BEDEC3B9
Tracking number: 2007-181-112013-0843
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 2FURY (2-508)
Unit name: 2-508TH / WARRIOR
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SVB2319960200
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED
Affiliation ENEMY
Type Enemy Action
Category Other (Hostile Action)
Date 2007-06-02 12:12

AFG20070731n491 RC EAST 33.39017105 69.35611725
2007-07-31 17:05 Non-Combat Event MEDCAP NEUTRAL
At 0850L the CMA team began a MEDCAP / VETCAP at the town of Kandaw Kalay (WB 3312 9460), Shwak district. The event ended at approximately 1330L. Approximately 251 people were treated during the MEDCAP (46x males over 30; 32 females over 15; 72x male children under 14; 35x females under 14; 66x males from 14-30). The predominant illnesses were gastro-intestinal ailment and minor aches and pains. The VETCAP treated approximately 301x animals (donkeys, goats, cows, camels).
The HTT team also gathered the following information:
-Kandaw Kalay is referred to as Hori Khel by the local residents.
-roughly 400x families live in Kandaw Kalay (8000x in the village; 12000 in Pakistan for various reasons)
-The following tribal sub-clans were identified:
Sarmat Khel (tribal elder: Ibrahim Jan)
Zinoor Khel (tribal elder: Hajji Jan Khan)
Qalandar Khel (tribal elder: Mir Zaman)
Niat Khel (tribal elder: Hajji Khialee)
All the above clans are sub-divisions of the Tori Khel Tribe.

-The dominant leader of the town in Hajji Hali. He has a nephew named Anwar Khan. The family owns a construction company named: the Abdullah Gombad Construction Company. The Khan family has a tight control over the population in this town.
-The elders complained of ANP stealing from local households as they conducted cordon and searches. They also claimed that the ANP rifled through the personal belongings of women, which is very demeaning and is meant as a show of dominance by the ANP. Elders requested that elders be present when ever a search took place.
-Main currency in the town is Pakistani Kaldaris (rupees), not Afghans. That indicates close economic ties of some sort with Pakistan. The Haqqani network may be a possible link between this town and Pakistan.
-HTTs assessments are that the town and its population are basically loyal to whoever can provide the largest economic benefits.
-Large widow population identified. They pose an economic burden upon the community. Women targeted economic / micro loans programs may be beneficial to the community.
-HTTs impression is that the MEDCAP was definitely staged by the Khan family. The event seems to have been attended mainly by Hajji Halis supporters, meaning that the average resident was not represented. It seems that the event was Hajji Halis way of asserting his authority to the population.

Report key: AD40AA7A-0EBE-41A8-B88B-3AFCD5AF6D8F
Tracking number: 2007-243-175615-0302
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3312094599
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070804n859 RC EAST 33.57236099 69.24778748
2007-08-04 16:04 Non-Combat Event
PRT DAILY REPORT DTG: 041530Z Aug 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR
MILITARY: All SECFOR personnel and selected PRT members conducted maintenance on organic equipment. Combat Logistics Patrol at Bagram Airfield (Resupply).
ECONOMIC: NSTR
SOCIAL: NSTR
SECURITY: NSTR
INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR

PROJECT STATUS: CDF were approved to be used in the Logar Motor Pool ($358,962) and the Paktya and Logar Seed Multiplication project ($61,429).

SCHEDULED IO EVENT: The Sayed Karam ribbon cuttings today were cancelled following the cell phone outage of the past 48 hours, which made it impossible to coordinate with the contractors. Kharwar School Ribbon Cutting on 5 August.

DC/PCC UPDATES:
ANP STATUS
CURRENT CLASS #s: Paktya: 2 Logar: 0
TOTAL TRAINED: Paktya: 197 Logar: 199
REMAINING TO TRAIN: Paktya: 101 Logar: 51

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 96 HOURS:

5 Aug
M1- Kharwar AUP Grid check
M2- Kharwar School ribbon cutting ceremony
M3- Secure Gardez Airfield for incoming PRT Air flight
M4- BAF CLP continues

6 Aug
M1- CE to Gardez University wall for QA/QC
M2- CE to AG Center for QA/QC
M3- CE to Gardez teacher training center well for QA/QC
M4- CA to Bonazai Village for assessment
M5- Secure Gardez Airfield for incoming STOL flight
M6- BAF CLP continues

7 Aug
M1- CA to Ahamad Abad District Center
M2- Paktya Provincial Development Committee meeting
M3- Secure Gardez Airfield for incoming PRT Air flight
M4- Meeting with the Logar Director of RRD
M5- HTT site survey at Gardez PRT
M6- BAF CLP continues

8 Aug
M1- UNAMA Security Meeting
M2- Tribal Liaison Office Meeting
M3- AUP grid check at Jaji
M4- Shurra at Jaji
M5- USDA assess Jaji
M6- HTT site survey at Gardez PRT

Report key: B65ED861-2CDC-44AE-A2CB-E2415C2A0087
Tracking number: 2007-217-065754-0210
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWC2299714769
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070823n847 RC EAST 33.5730896 69.24739075
2007-08-23 10:10 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL

PRT Gardez received 8 personnel today that are here to assist with medical and veterinary engagements that will be launched is conjunction with Operation Khyber. Three additional personnel will arrive at the FOB tomorrow.

Personnel currently here are: Maj Truesdell, TF Fury Brigade Surgeon, 1 female medics from Salerno, 1 female interpreter from FOB Sharana, and 5 individuals from the Human Terrain Team (HTT).

Tomorrow we will receive Lt Col Ferris, Maj Probst, and a male interpreter from the CMA Cell at BAF.

The PRT conducted a joint planning meeting that included the PRT CA cell, The PRT PA, Maj truesdell, Col (ret) Swisher and Ms. St. Benoit from the HTT, Lt Euse, 4-73 CAV MEDO, and Mr. Rick Carbone, USAID Field Rep.

Report key: 141603BF-B8AF-4C64-B8F9-B78A117D25E0
Tracking number: 2007-236-102937-0854
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWC2295914850
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070825n854 RC EAST 33.5730896 69.24739075
2007-08-25 16:04

LAST 24-Hours:

1. Gardez PRT PA (Strope) and Fury Bde Surg (Truesdell) met with Gardez ANA/MoD Hospital leadership (Deputy Commander) and Hospital ETT Team Leader (COL Nielsen) to discuss:

- Mechanism to regulate ANSF medevacs to Gardez ANA/MoD Hospital
- How PRT and Fury can partner with ETT support plan of ANA/MoD Hospital for education, training, and capacity building
- Use of ANA medical personnel (Docs, Medics) for Medical Engagements with CMA Team ISO OP Khyber (also discussed with ANA Corps Surgeonwho will discuss with ANA Corps Commander)
- Discussed attachment of ETT female physician to CMA Team as necessary to conduct medical engagements during duration of OP Khyber

2. CMA team personnel from CJTF82 arrived at GDZ. Full team (Docs both sexes, PA, Vet, Medics both sexes, Linguists both sexes, HTTtotal 10 PAX) from Fury, PRT, and CJTF82 is now on-site at GDZ and ready to begin CMA operations.

3. PRT PA, Fury Bde Surg, Bde FECC Chief, Bde Med Planner, CAV personnel discussed details of CMA Operations to include:

- Timeline to begin operations (now that CMA Team is full-up and ready to deploy from GDZ)
- Vehicles/Security
- Daily MDMP/planning cycle (and information/intel flow from maneuver unit to CA/PRT to CMA)
- Location of operations
- 2 potential hasty operations for immediate effects while waiting for planning of deliberate operations include: Wazi Zadran (due to its relative stability) + engagements with Kuchi tribes nearby FOB GDZ

NEXT 24-Hours:

1. PRT PA, Fury Bde Surg, CA Cell Chief/XO, CAV personnel to discuss specific upcoming deliberate operations (as well as the hasty operations noted aboveWazi Zadran and Kuchi) and timelines based on desired effects as determined by PRT, CAV, ANA Commanders.

2. Identify specific ANA providers (Docs and Medics) available to join CMA team for medical engagements.

FUTURE:

1. Goal is to perform medical/veterinary engagements (assessments, MEDCAPs, KLEs, VMO, TCM missions) with CMA and HTT Teams embedded with PRT/CAV on a daily basisat locations identified by CAV based on desired effects.

2. Return to Gardez ANA/MoD Hospital to meet with Hospital Commander (COL SultanGul) to discuss issues broached with Deputy Cdr today.

3. Visit Paktya Provincial Hospital in Gardez to continue PRT assessments of needs and capabilities and continue capacity building at that facility.

Report key: 6A711194-BD44-4BB2-A87C-32DC6E278937
Tracking number: 2007-237-160339-0754
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWC2295914850
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070830n812 RC EAST 33.39017105 69.35611725
2007-08-30 02:02 Non-Combat Event MEDCAP NEUTRAL

CA TM co-located with TM Barkzai conducted population assessments at the town of Kandaw Kalay in order to verify the feasibility of a VMO, MEDCAP / VETCAP. After compiling assessments from the CA TM, HTT, the MEDCAP TM, and A6, TM Barkzai decided to conduct a MEDCAP / VETCAP at that location in the next 24 hours. Details for the MEDCAP / VETCAP:

MEDCAP
Population breakdown:
-400 families
-approximately 8000 pax (12000 in Pakistan as migrant labor)
-300-400x expected participants for MEDCAP
-25% under age of 14
-15% female 14-25yrs
-30% male 14-25yrs
-30% mixture of elderly and sexes

VETCAP
-300x animals expected to be treated: goats, sheep, donkeys, cows, horses, buffalos mix

Timeline
SP from Shwak clinic 0700L
In Place at Kandaw Kalay 0800L
VETCAP start 0845L
MEDCAP start 1000L
Both events end at 1400L

Security Plan
MEDCAP: 2x UAH; 2x ANA NTVs; 1x ANA Ambulance
VETCAP: 2x UAH; 2x ANP NTVs;
ANA establish outer cordon on the high ground and ANP establish inner cordon / crowd control.
The MEDCAP will take place at a partially constructed school at Kandaw Kalay while the VETCAP will take place nearby in an open area.

Report key: F931CD08-F491-42C1-B2BD-5BB08DC91FF0
Tracking number: 2007-243-021808-0820
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3312094599
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

RC EAST: 311530Z GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 311530Z Aug 07 LAST 24: SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez POLITICAL: NSTR MILITARY: 31AUG07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini, PRT Medic, CMA, and HTT + SECFOR A MED &amp.

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 311530Z Aug 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
31AUG07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini, PRT Medic, CMA, and HTT + SECFOR
A MED & VET operation was conducted in the Kandaw Kalay village. Said village has approximately 8000 people (400 families). MED Ops attendance was of 230 persons. VET Ops 301 animals were seen (Goats, cows, sheep, donkeys, and camels).

Other topics: The HTT was able to gather the following information:
100% of the attendees at the MED Ops were Pashtums.
They are four Sub-Clams: Zarmast, Sinor khel, Kalaner Khel, and Niat Khel.
They have many of their relatives living in Pakistan.
They do most of their business in Khost.
The woman are interested in learning how to sew.
Their concerns are irrigation, schools and power.
The wealthy people go to Khost for health care and the poor go to Gardez. During winter time the road is closed and they do not have access to health care.
No midwife was identified during the MED operation.
Hakani has a great influence in their area.
They do business with Pakistan currency no Afghans.
Most of their economy comes out of farming and the men labor out of Pakistan.
There is no national identity.

ECONOMIC: NSTR
SOCIAL: NSTR
SECURITY: NSTR
INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS:
31AUG07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
Gerda Zerai Shura, at 0815(L), Main Topics:
The Gerda Zerai elders submitted 12 members for the District Development Committee (DDC). This to have equal representation among their tribes. The majority of the discussion was between the elders and the ANA. They did not break for translation, which shows much greater ownership of the governance in the area.

Gerda Zerai Shura, at 0850(L), Main Topics:
The Gerda Zerai tribes are composed of the Soray Khel, Sultan Khel, Poorangay, and Toro Khel. There is a feud between the Sultan Khel and Toro Khel. The elders will elect a district commissioner by tomorrow. This meeting was led by the ANA. The DDC will propose the development projects but, they are in need of a school. They also stated that they had reported the enemy for 3 years without any action from the government. They will have a shura tomorrow at the district center 0900(L).

NEXT 24 HOURS:
1SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, continue with village assessments at Swack.
1LT Newman CA Team, will do site recon for MED/VET operation with the PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR. Continue with Gerda Zerai assessments.

Report key: DF4C5B47-E4C1-40D9-9058-918EAF9669A4
Tracking number: 2007-243-171602-0552
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
Affiliation NEUTRAL
Type Non-Combat Event
Category Other
Date 2007-08-31 15:03

AFG20070831n505 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
2007-08-31 03:03 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS, 28 to 30AUG07, REPORT DTG: 301530Z Aug 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL:
29Aug 07
Gerda Zerai Shura, Main Topics

ANA BDE Commander:
- The need for local support in establishing security in Gerdai Serai
- The need for tribal solidarity against the ACM
- ANAP recruitment from the Gerda Serai Tribes
- Needs of the community. Future projects and development
- $100K District Development Committee concept
- MEDCAP / VETCAP availability at Gerda Serai

Dep. Prov. Governor:
- Need for locally established security and tribal cooperation.
- Compared tribally established security in Jajji with the lack of security in Zurmat. Used Jajji as a good example to follow.
- The tribal land dispute between the Parangai, Sultan Khel, and Kha Khel tribes was address. The following COAs were mentioned for conflict resolution:
- Hold a Tribal Jirga at Gardez with all the conflicting tribes attending in order to come up with a solution
- Invite UNAMA to mediate between the conflicting tribes in order to find a solution
- The conflicting tribal elders get together on their own IOT find a solution

- ANA and ANP recruitment needed. Gerda Serai elders agreed to provide 30 ANAP by 31AUG07.
- The Dep. Gov. offered to let the tribal elders choose their own DC. Otherwise, he would choose one for them. He also promised to write a petition to MOI for official recognition of Gerda Serai as a district.

Haji Maipir Khan (Gerda Serai Head Elder)
- He expressed that the people of Gerda Serai are poor. Any and all projects, including the road construction, must employ local labor in order to boost the economy.
- The people of Gerda Serai need a DC in order to bypass all the official corruption in Gardez (i.e. in order to get a ID card, locals have to pay multiple bribes to provincial officials)
- $100K from the District Development Committee must be spent on building a Madrassa. This will keep local young men from going to Pakistan for education, which radicalizes them.
- The PRT and the ANSF have broken many promises before. How can we trust the PRT and ANSF now?
- Maipir asked for the release of 3x detainees who were arrested a few days ago by the ANSF.
- Elders including Maipir agreed to provide 30x ANAP.

Military:
28AUG07
- PRT Civil Affairs (CA) team moved from PRT Gardez FOB to Swack to conduct: district assessments, shuras, coordinate Humanitarian Assistance (HA) drops, coordinate MED/VET operations, identify Quick Impact Projects (QIP), and long term projects. First district to assess Swack.

29AUG07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini,
- 0900(L) elders provided six names for the District Development Committee (This based on their tribal composition: 2 main tribes, Ibraham Khel and Shabak Khel each main tribe with 3 sub-tribes).
- Village assessment of the Ker Khel village and Gol Khel village each with a population of 300. Their concern are better roads. They have water wells and power from a generator.

29AUG07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman
- Movement to FOB Wilderness and later to Gerda Zerai.

29AUG07, PRT Medic, CMA, and HTT + SECFOR (3 Vehicle)
- Movement to FOB Wilderness and later to Shwack.

30AUG07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini,
- The elders submitted 9 names for the District Development Committee. Coordinated with the elders a MED & VET Operation at Tori Khel village, Shwack.

30AUG07, PRT Medic, CMA, and HTT + SECFOR (3 Vehicle)
- Preparing for MED/VET Operation.

30AUG07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman,
- Did a small shura with elders to re-enforce the 9 names for the DDC. Discussed with the elders the possibility of a MED/VET operation (place to be provided).

ECONOMIC: NSTR
SOCIAL: NSTR
SECURITY: NSTR
INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

31Aug
Khyber Ops:
- 1LT Orsini CA Team + PRT Medic, CMA, HTT, and SECFOR, 1000(L), MED & VET Operation at Tori Khel village, Shwack, population 12000.
- 1LT Newman CA Team, 0900(L), elders will return with the District Development Committee names. Coordinating for HA, MED/VET ops, and doing village assessments.

Report key: 022F7CA8-3A6B-4594-A60C-26A74F6233AF
Tracking number: 2007-243-033507-0568
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070901n943 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-09-01 17:05 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 011730Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
1SEP07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini CA Team
CA TM conducted a KLE with tribal elders and discussed the possibility of installing a DCN (District Communication Node) at the Shwak DC. Then the CA team visited several villages in Shwak and conducted village assessments. The villages of Khojat Khel, Gul Khan, and Kar Khel were assessed. Water wells and Karez cleaning were the biggest demands from the villages assessed. In addition to the assessments, the CA TM also collected feedback on yesterdays MEDCAP/VETCAP. The CA TM met with the District Development Committee (DDC) in order to discuss the project list for Shwak.

1SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
The CA TM conducted a shura with the DDC. Representatives from all four of the dominant tribes in the district attended the shura in order to discuss future projects. The following five categories of projects were identified as being priorities: Electricity, schools, clinics, roads, and water systems. When asked if the tribes wanted generators for power, they replied that they could not afford the fuel and maintenance costs. The Tribes asked specifically for micro hydro power. The CA TM will also collect the final project list from the DDC in the next 24.

ECONOMIC: NSTR
SOCIAL: NSTR
SECURITY: NSTR
INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS:
1SEP07, PRT CO attended the Waze Zadran Shura
MAIN TOPICS:
ANA BDE CDR:
-Tribal shuras conducted at each of the three districts
-$100K District Development Committee program
-Proposed Khowst / Paktya Joint governance and security building (to be built at the border of Waze Zadran and Shamal)
-Promised 2x conexes of HA and development projects to the people of Waze Zadran.

PROV. DEP. GOVERNOR:
-Used example of Jajji and Mangal tribes uniting against ACM forces in their districts. Promoted tribal solidarity against ACm.
-Discussed new refugee ID card process and aid available to incoming refugees in Paktya.
-Promoted the State run Hajj program (state pays for trip to Mecca and back) which is based upon a lottery system. Promoted local registration for the lottery.
-ANAP recruitment. Asked for 30x ANAP from the district.

TRIBAL ELDERS:
-The people of this district have been happy with the performance of ANA and CF forces. However, the ANP needs closer supervision. They have a tendency to steal and to rifle through the belongings of women. When the Russians were here, we did not allow them to search our homes and look at our women. But now we have our own muslim brothers going through the personal belongings of our women. Instead of searching our homes, consult the elders and we will help you find the ACM.
-For the past 35 years there have been nothing but conflict in this country. The people are used to fighting. So you cant blame us for the occasional attacks on vehicles traveling through the KG Pass. The people are poor and they are tempted by commerce traveling in the pass. Not all attacks are from ACM.
-Corruption in the IRoA is overwhelming. Government officials in Kabul do not care about the people. Only care about their own pockets.
-Elders were so frustrated with IRoA corruption and lack of promise keeping, one elder walked off in a fit.
-In Wazi Zadran, we have already chosen to keep foreign fighters out. We have security.
-The District Development Committee (DDC) $100K is only a drop in the bucket. Too little money. Over 100,000 people in this district alone.

NEXT 24 HOURS:

2SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, continue with village assessments at Swack.

1LT Newman CA Team, preparing for MED/VET Operation in Gerda Zerai. Conducting site recon for MED/VET operation with the PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR.

Report key: B8F69F41-AA4D-4A7E-BC94-20FBAAA526BB
Tracking number: 2007-245-023252-0446
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070902n904 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
2007-09-02 17:05 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 021730Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
2SEP07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini CA Team
ANA distributed the following HA at the town of Ali Mohammad in Wazi Zadran district:
200x school kits; 40x teacher kits; 80x hygiene kits; 80x adult shoes; 60x childrens shoes; 40x adult coats; 40x childrens coats; 2x red rugs; 1x large green carpet; 4x elder Korans; 1x mullah Koran; 4x prayer rugs; 1x PA system, and 16x cans of paint.
The CA TM conducted KLEs with the tribal elders of the Shabak Khel tribe in Shwak district. The Shabak Khel is one of the two dominant tribes in Shwak, the other being Ibrahim Khel. Topics of discussion included projects from the District Development Committee (DDC). A list of projects from the Ibrahim Khel tribe was also collected earlier in the day. The list included 8x wells and 2x retention walls. The village well locations follow:
Gul Khan: 1x well
Ker Khel: 1x well
Khojat Khel: 2x wells (POC: Qadir Khan, 0799735482)
Lambali / Wali Khel: 1x well
Kori Khel: 1x well
Ghoran: 1x well
Landi Kot: 1x well

The CA TM also requested school supply kits, winter clothes, construction tools for irrigation work, and wheat seed for villages in Shwak. The above items will be delivered ASAP via ANA 5 ton vehicles. The CA TM also discovered that the Tori Khel tribe of Kandaw Kalay, which is where the last MEDCAP / VETCAP took place, is actually considered to be a part of Gerda Serai as opposed to Shwak. This is in contrast to the official district boundary. However, since the perceptions of the tribes are what matters the CA TM at Shwak proposed another MEDCAP / VETCAP at the Shwak high school for the tribes of Shwak. In the next 24, the CA TM will continue to conduct population assessments and focus primarily on the Shabak Khel Tribe.

2SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
The CMA team and the HTT team moved to Gerda Serai they engaged the local doctor and also the 4-1 Kandak RCA CDR. The plan is to conduct a MEDCAP / VETCAP at 0900L IVO the local doctors home (Omar Gul; WB 33491 91383). The CA TM also engaged the DDC members in order to obtain a list of projects and the DDC members expressed a interest in expanding the size of the current school in Gerda Serai. The CA TM assessed the existing school and found that the school was fully staffed with teachers paid by the MOE. The CA TM and the DDC agreed that a additional section for female students would be beneficial. The PRT engineers assessed that an 8 room structure could be built for approximately $100K as an addition to the current school. In the next 24, the CA TM will get a written agreement amongst the four main tribes (each with DDC members) for the expanded school. ANA will also give 10,000KGs of wheat seed (which was delivered to B6 yesterday) to the DDC members for distribution amongst the 4 main tribes. This will help to legitimize their new found status as DDC members. Elders asked for 200x school kits, teacher kits, and childrens clothes.

ECONOMIC: NSTR
SOCIAL: NSTR
SECURITY: NSTR
INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

3SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, continue with village assessments at Swack.

1LT Newman CA Team, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR: MED/VET Operation in Gerda Zerai.

Report key: 70F87B0E-AF5E-4F72-8072-D8904CE117C1
Tracking number: 2007-246-032316-0553
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070903n959 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
2007-09-03 16:04 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 031730Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
3SEP07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini CA Team
The CA TM at Shwak conducted KLEs with the leaders of the DDC in order to get a complete list of projects for the district. In the next 24 hours, TM Barkzai will conduct a HA drop consisting of School kits (for the primary school), hygiene kits, construction tools, and a mosque improvement package. The CA TM will also conduct surveys of all DDC nominated project sites with the assistance of the PRT SECFOR and a PRT engineer. After the survey is over, the CA TM will move on to Waze Zadran.

3SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
Today a MEDCAP / VETCAP was conducted at Gerda Serai IVO the residence of a local doctor, Omar Gul (WB 33491 91383). Turnout was lesser than the first MEDCAP / VETCAP, and the participants were predominantly male. Festering tribal conflicts are suspected for the poor turn out. MEDCAP: 149x men, 7x women, 7x children. VETCAP: 100x goats, 19x sheep, 2x donkeys.

ANA is also coordinating the distribution of wheat seeds (100x bags into 4 parts) via the DDC members. During the meeting with the DDC, the tribal members failed to come to an agreement on where the school that they requested with the $100K will be built. As a result, the DDC will have to reconvene again in the future for an alternate project request. At the meeting the DDC members, some of whom are members of the conflicting tribes in the district, also discussed possible COAs for resolving the conflict. Having a neutral judge in Gardez rule on the conflict was identified as the preferred course of action. A temporary cease fire was agreed upon until Sunday in order to await the ruling of the provincial judge.

ECONOMIC: NSTR
SOCIAL: NSTR
SECURITY: NSTR
INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

4SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, Movement to Waze Zadran to start conducting assessments.

1LT Newman CA Team, continue doing village assessments and identifying viable CERP projects.

PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR: Re-organizing from MED/VET operation in Gerda Zerai.

Report key: B8667411-7AD5-4E94-A4E4-16116C6C0B55
Tracking number: 2007-246-161103-0317
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070904n945 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-09-04 17:05 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 041730Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
4SEP07, Shawck, 1LT Orsini CA Team, and PRT Civil Engineer
The CA team did a meeting with contractors to discuss and show them site of quick impact projects. PRT Civil Engineer and CA conducted DC assessments for future improvement projects. The projects include wells, retention walls, and improvements to the District Centers.

4SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
CA team kept working with the DDC to identify quick impact projects. They want to push big money, Long Term projects. Doing village assessments.

ECONOMIC: NSTR

SOCIAL: NSTR

SECURITY: PRT did not participate in this activity, below information provided by the 4/73rd S-5/9:
ANA attended a shura at the village of Seyyed Khel in order to discuss the future construction of a joint, inter-provincial, security building at the Khowst side of the K-G Pass. The following are the talking points from the shura (written by CPT Russel, PSYOPs OIC):

This shura was called by the ANA CDR to ask the elders for land to build a new security outpost. Seyyed Khel was chosen due to its proximity to the provincial border. Themes for the shura were security, support the government (cooperation) and opportunities. There were approximately 35 elders present. The ANA hosted the event that included a short meeting about the land, visiting the site and lunch. The BDE RCA opened the meeting with Koran versus and prayer. The ANA BDE CDR opened the meeting with themes of security, cooperation and opportunities.

ANA BDE CDR
OPERATION KHYBER is bringing opportunities for the people of the KG Pass. We are all brothers and we should all follow the rule of the government. We apologize if we searched the wrong homes. The people that were arrested were taken to Gardez. If they are not guilty they will be brought back to your village. Work with your District Sub Governors. We want to build new check points and a new security outpost here near the provincial line between Khost and Paktia. Both Khost and Paktia will work together to keep the pass secure. The districts will also work together with the tribes of Shamal and Waze Zadran to ensure fairness in creating new jobs. You need to work together to provide an answer on where to build the outpost by tomorrow.

LTC WOODS
LTC Woods echoed all these same themes and messages.

HAJI GHANJI KHAN, VILLAGE ELDER
This project is important to us. But one thing is there are two tribes that should be involved with this decision and only one is present, Jawal and Ghawak. We are concerned that there is no space in Seyyed Khel. There is no place to land the helicopters. The ANA CDR interrupted the elder and reminded him that they needed to makes a decision. The elders went to there small groups for about 15 minutes and returned, Haji Khan continued that they had made a decision on a location. The location is west of Seyyed Khel and we can take you there. The team went to the site and returned for lunch at the school. It was decided that further shuras were needed with the provincial leadership and that the engineers needed to assess the site location.

INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: PRT did not participate in this activity, below information provided by the 4/73rd S-5/9:
DDC members from Gerda Serai visited the ANA TAC in order to request a micro-hydro power project with its $100K. However, not all the DDC members were present and $100K is not nearly enough to pay for a micro-hydro project. They were informed that once the DDC had proven that it could work together as a united body by making good use of its initial $100K, more funds would be made available for long term projects. During the meeting the representatives asked for a road linking Gerda Serai to the main K-G Pass. An initial proposal was made to employ 400x males from all four of the conflicting tribe for 4 months. It would be a labor intensive project with no heavy equipment involved. The DDC members agreed to hold a shura with 3F6 on 08SEP07 at the Gerda Serai DC IOT further discuss the road project.

PRT Note: The PRT CA team in Gerda Zerai had already discussed this issue with the DDC. The DDC keeps pushing they Long Term projects no Quick Impact Projects.

NEXT 24 HOURS:

5SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, Waze Zadran, start the District Development Committee creation and development ideas for quick impact project. Identify an area for doing a MED/VET Operation.

1LT Newman CA Team, continue doing village assessments and identifying viable CERP projects.

PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR: Re-organizing and movement to Shawk for a second MED/VET operation.

Report key: 4C6F39BE-187C-45CA-930F-821435479AD6
Tracking number: 2007-248-040613-0451
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070905n1002 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
2007-09-05 17:05 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 051741Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
5SEP07, Waze Zadran, 1LT Orsini CA Team, and PRT Civil Engineer
ANA, in conjunction with the CA team, conducted a tribal shura with the district leadership in order to establish a DDC for the district and also to obtain a list of future projects. The DDC members for Wazi Zadran follows:
-Abdul Wali: District Sub-governor, Jaoul Tribe
-Julal: Jaoul Tribe, Alimat Khel village
-Sadarat: Jaoul Tribe, Bakhol village
-Jawat Meer: Jahuk tribe, Nasir Khel village
-Katali: Jahuk Tribe, Lakatega village
-Wali Zar Khan: Jahuk Tribe, Mangat Khel village
-Yusof: Jaoul Tribe, Khand village
-Haji Nawab: Ayu Khel, Meti village
-Afsar: Ayu Khel, Serai village
-Raies: Ayu Khel, Waza village
The DDC also obtained a list of proposed projects which the PRT is currently vetting.
The future site of the Joint security building IVO Seyyed Khel village was also assessed by the PRT engineer.

5SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
ANA conducted KLEs with the leaders of the Parangai tribe. The Parangai elders expressed frustration and impatience at the lack of resolution over their land dispute with the Sultan Khel Tribe. They threatened to resume violence and forcibly retake the land in dispute. In response, A6 contacted the Sultan Khel Tribe and arranged for a shura in the next 24 hrs. The shura will take place at 0430L. The CMA / HTT team left Gerda Serai and conducted movement to Shwak. The CMA team will conduct MEDCAP / VETCAP in the next 48 hours. The PRT Engineer also conducted a preliminary survey of the improved road in Gerda Serai IOT prepare for future road projects. An initial assessment of the scope of work and a cost estimate were forwarded to brigade for consultation and funding.

5SEP07, Shawk, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR
The CMA / HTT team conducted movement to Shwak clinic in order to prepare for future medical operations. They will conduct a shura in the next 24 hours in order to advertise the MEDCAP / VETCAP coming up on 07SEP07. A ANA Truck load of HA for Shwak also arrived at the BDE TAC location for distribution. 2A and the CA team is currently coordinating HA distro in the next 24 hours with district leadership lead and ANSF support. The HA consists mainly of school supplies, construction tools, and a mosque improvement package.

INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

6SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, Waze Zadran, keep conversations with the District Development Committee in order to identify quick impact project. Identify an area for doing a MED/VET Operation.

1LT Newman CA Team, continue doing village assessments and identifying viable CERP projects.

PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR: Preparing for the second MED/VET operation in Shawk.

Report key: 19C1C011-4D7F-45EA-9FE2-2665D65647F5
Tracking number: 2007-248-174110-0815
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

GERDA SERAI TRIBAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT
(HTT Report)

Main Tribe: Zadran Tribe
Sub-tribe: Supail, Mayzai
Population estimate: 127,000

Mayzai sub-tribes (Gerda Serai Tribes):
-Soori Khel
-Toori Khel
-Sultan Khel
-Kha Khel
-Parangi
-Bakharai
-Shapak
-Ibrahim Khel

Majority Tribes: Sultan Khel, Toori Khel, Soori Khel
Minority Tribes: Parangi, Ibrahim Khel (dominant in Shwak). Most of the Parangi and Ibrahim Khel tribe members are currently in Pakistan.

Tribal Conflict: Sultan Khel vs. Parangi

Cause of Conflict: Land dispute. Fighting over Gurba Mountain (WB 308 901) and its various resources (i.e. pine nuts, fire wood, etc.)

History behind conflict:
The current land dispute in Gerda Serai has been ongoing for the past 63 years. In the past several decades alone 32 people have died from the conflict. The Sultan Khel tribe claims that they have the official land deeds for the mountain. However, the Parangai claim that the deed is fabricated. The Parangi tribe wants IRoA intervention and mediation instead of local resolution because they fear both local and ex-patriot repercussions. As the minority tribe in the district, the Parangi tribe probably does not expect to win a local struggle against the majority Sultan Khel tribe. Ironically, the Parangi tribe also fears retribution from its large and influential ex-patriot community in Pakistan. If it attempted and failed to resolve the conflict locally with a favorable outcome, they believe that ex-patriots who still claim land on the mountain will disapprove. It is believed that a local Parangi mosque recently underwent a $100,000 refurbishment with funds donated by a wealthy Parangi nuclear scientist in Germany. The ex-patriot link is obviously very strong in the tribe.

ACM influence in Gerda Serai: Haqqani himself belongs to the Sultan Khel Tribe. Some of Haqqanis sons and many of his extended relatives are still reside in Gerda Serai. Gerda Serai is without a doubt, a Haqqani network stronghold. The Parangi tribe is also subject to strong Taliban influence, although the Parangi are not believed to share the Talibans ideology. They simply provide shelter and material support. Once OPN Khyber ends, it is believed that HQN and Taliban forces will return to the district in force.

Report key: D14DE4C4-7441-43AF-A63D-83D7F1DB11A5
Tracking number: 2007-249-130730-0129
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3349191383
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
Affiliation NEUTRAL
Type Non-Combat Event
Category Tribal Feud
Date 2007-09-06 13:01

AFG20070906n1091 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
2007-09-06 15:03 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 061500Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
6SEP07, Waze Zadran, 1LT Orsini CA Team, and PRT Civil Engineer
The CA TM conducted population assessments and made initial arrangements for the future MEDCAP / VETCAP in Wazi Zadran district. The location will be the Wazi Zadran DC. AHTP, the clinic manager does not allow a CF MEDCAP to take place inside the clinic. However, he stated that he would participate in the MEDCAP if it took place at an alternate location.

6SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
The CMA / HTT team conducted initial assessments of the Shwak clinic and the Shwak High School in preparation for a MEDCAP / VETCAP on 07SEP07. They engaged the school headmaster and the clinic doctor. The CMA / HTT team got permission to conduct a MEDCAP / VETCAP out of the high school and the local doctor is scheduled to attend. The MEDCAP will start at 1100L and end at 1500L.

ANA picked up 300 school kits, 40 teacher kits, 10 soccer balls, 60 pairs of childrens shoes, and a mosque improvement package from the ANA TAC. The HA will be distributed to a local mosque and to a primary school belonging to the Shabak Khel Tribe.

6SEP07, Shawk, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR
CMA prepared for tomorrows MED/VET Operation. The CMA / HTT team also conducted site recon for the upcoming Wazi Zadran MED/VET Ops on 08SEP07.

INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

7SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, Waze Zadran, do village assessments and identify quick impact project. Announce through the elders the MED/VET Operation.

1LT Newman CA Team, Gerda Serai, continue doing village assessments and identifying viable CERP projects.

PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR: MED/VET operation in Shawk. After finishing Shawk MED operation move and prepare for MED/VET Ops in Waze Zadran.

Report key: B42C16A7-84AD-4B86-81BA-5D6575007BF9
Tracking number: 2007-249-150607-0456
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070906n1092 RC EAST 33.57234955 69.24778748
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-09-06 15:03 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL

PRT DAILY REPORT DTG: 061700Z Sep 07

LAST 24: SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: The PRT Commander traveled with the Paktya Governor and Chief of Police to Jani Khel in order to discuss the site placement of the AUP station and other issues. This is the first visit for both the PRT Commander and the Paktya Governor and Chief of Police to the area. A full report has not been made as the PRT Commander did not travel back by air, but elected to use ground transport.

MILITARY: The PRT Security Forces deployed a squad to Jani Khel to mark the Shura LZ site. They will move to Chamkani or return to Gardez depending on mission requirements and daylight availability.

ECONOMIC: NSTR

SOCIAL: Waze Zadran Team: The CA TM conducted population assessments and made initial arrangements for the future MEDCAP / VETCAP in Waze Zadran district. The location will be the Waze Zadran DC. AHTP, the clinic manager does not allow a CF MEDCAP to take place inside the clinic. However, he stated that he would participate in the MEDCAP if it took place at an alternate location.
Gerda Serai Team: The CMA / HTT team conducted initial assessments of the Shwak clinic and the Shwak High School in preparation for a MEDCAP / VETCAP on 07SEP07. They engaged the school headmaster and the clinic doctor. The CMA / HTT team got permission to conduct a MEDCAP / VETCAP out of the high school and the local doctor is scheduled to attend. The MEDCAP will start at 1100L and end at 1500L.

CMA/HTT/SECFOR: CMA prepared for tomorrows MED/VET Operation. The CMA / HTT team also conducted site recon for the upcoming Waze Zadran MED/VET Ops on 08SEP07.

SECURITY: NSTR
INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: The IO traveled with the PRT Commander in order to cover the Shura at Jani Khel.
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: POA visit 10 Sep in the Zadran Arc.

DC/PCC UPDATES:
ANP STATUS
CURRENT CLASS #s: Paktya: 2 Logar: 0
TOTAL TRAINED: Paktya: 197 Logar: 199
REMAINING TO TRAIN: Paktya: 101 Logar: 51

KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS:

NEXT 96 HOURS: (WHY?)

7 Sep
M1 – CA Teams continue support of Operation Khyber with visits and project development in order to bring development and good governance to the region.
M2 PRT conducts training in preparation of Ramadan, highlighting cultural and religious activities, customs associated with the holidays, and changed activity schedule of the local nationals.

8 Sep
M1 – CA Teams continue support of Operation Khyber with visits and project development in order to bring development and good governance to the region.
M2 – USDA distributes fertilizer to the Paktya Agriculture Department in order to assist in the planting of winter wheat.
M3 Engineers and USDA conduct QA/QC of the Underground Storage Facility and the Teachers Training Centers to ensure that the scope of work is abided by and that progress is on schedule.
M4 Jaji Shura with the Governor, District Leaders, and PRT CDR at the Governors compound to discuss security and land issues.

9 Sep
M1 – CA Teams continue support of Operation Khyber with visits and project development in order to bring development and good governance to the region.
M2 USDA facilitates the Logar Seed delivery to demonstrate the ability of the IRoA to assist farmers in growing winter wheat crops.
M3 CE QA/QCs the Logar Motorpool in order to assess the adherence to the Scope of Work and ensure that the project is abiding by the building schedule.

10 Sep
M1 The PRT CDR and DOS Rep will attend the Afghan Presidential Shura in the Zadran Arc in order to support the IRoAs legitimacy in the region.
M2 The PRT XO will travel to Logar in order to attend the weekly Provincial Security Meeting and share information concerning security in the region.
M3 – CA Teams continue support of Operation Khyber with visits and project development in order to bring development and good governance to the region.

Report key: B98C4611-9437-465B-B407-DB4ED25F8280
Tracking number: 2007-249-151215-0686
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWC2299714768
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070907n1066 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-09-07 17:05 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 071730Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
7SEP07, Waze Zadran, 1LT Orsini CA Team,
ANA conducted a large scale HA drop in Waze Zadran. Almost two conexes of winter HA (food, clothing, school / hygiene kits) were distributed along with 6000 kg of enriched winter wheat seed. The HA distribution was coordinated between the 1-1 Kandak leadership, the ANA RCA commander, tribal elders from the 4 main tribes, and the district leadership itself. The HA was distributed in 4 different villages under close ANSF supervision. The CA TM along with ANA also set the ground work for the Waze Zadran MEDCAP / VETCAP in the next 24 hours.

7SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
The CA team also managed to get a list of DDC projects from the Gerda Serai DDC. The elders asked for 5 water wells with a solar powered pump and a reservoir. One would go to each of the four main tribes and the fifth well would go to the local clinic which is centrally located.

7SEP07, Shawk, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR
Today the CMA and HTT teams conducted a MEDCAP at the Shwak High school. The MEDCAP started at 1100L and ended at 1500L. The following numbers of patients were treated:
-girls under 14: 16x
-boys under 14: 71x
-boys 14-30: 44x
-boys over 30: 24x
No women were treated.
The relatively low turn out is due mainly to possible tribal tensions in the area. The HTT team is currently assessing the situation and will submit a report ASAP.

INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

8SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR: MED/VET Ops in Waze Zadran. Continue doing village assessments and identifying viable CERP projects.

1LT Newman CA Team, Gerda Serai, continue doing village assessments and identifying viable CERP projects.

Report key: DA2796B7-D19B-4E7A-9C03-C52EDC488EC4
Tracking number: 2007-251-025103-0136
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

RC EAST: 26 JAN 08 TF Fury PRT Gardez reports on Zormat Road Pay Day and HTT Assessments
Reports on the Zormat Road Project pay day, HTT assesements of the Zormat bazaar, and the PRT assessment of Shakyan village is attached.

SEE ATTACHED [not attached in Wikileaks]

Report key: 03074BB3-66E7-42AC-AE39-816B02A4E826
Tracking number: 2008-026-151332-0906
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB0286899696
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
Affiliation NEUTRAL
Type Non-Combat Event
Category Meeting
Date 2008-01-26 15:03

AFG20070908n1072 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
2007-09-08 17:05 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 081730Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
8SEP07, Waze Zadran, 1LT Orsini CA Team,
ANA picked up a truck load of HA consisting of winter clothing, farming tools, and school kits from the TAC site IOT conduct a HA drop in Shwak in the next 24 hours. The CA team from Waze Zadran moved to L/U with 2A in order to assist in the HA drop.

8SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
ANA along with 3F6 conducted a shura at the Gerda Serai DC IOT discuss the Gerda Serai DDC and it list of projects. The following are excepts from the shura.

Main Topics:

-3F6 discussed te $100K DDC fund available to Gerda Serai. He emphasized that the $100K was just a drop in the bucket compared to all the money that would be available in the future, but he made it clear that the 4 tribes had to prove their ability to cooperate with each other before big projects could be vetted.
-3F6 stated that due to the tribal dynamic and conflicts in Gerda Serai, the IRoA and the CF refused to discuss large scale projects ATT. We had to be extra careful here.
-Also the latent ACM threat in the area made us even more cautious of big scale projects at this time.
-3F6 also discuss the future Gerda Serai unimproved road project. He explained how it would employ 300x men over the difficult winter. He also emphasized that local security was crucial to the projects success.
-3F6 stated that we were ready to start the road project in about 3-4 weeks.
-He promised that there would be future shuras in order to hammer out the details of the road project.
-However, before we could discussed the road any further, 3F6 asked for the DDC project list.
-One of the elders explained that due to the tribal dynamics in the region, they had to pick 12 DDC member. 3 from each tribe. They also included the new DC, Izzat Khan, to the committee, which made the committee 13 strong.
-The elder listed three categories of projects in order of priority:
1) Micro hydro power
2) Health clinics
3) Schools
-The elders claimed that all four of the tribes had water sources that could power a micro hydro plant.
-3F6 once again emphasized that a project of that magnitude would cost far too much. $100K was not nearly enough money for micro hydro.
-The ANA BDE CDR expressed frustration at the DDC for not being able to agree on a project list. Especially when all the other districts had already succeeded in doing so.
-At this point, 3F6 made an ultimatum. He told the DDC that until they managed to come up with a common project list at the DC today, the district would lose not only the $100K but also the $260K for the road. He stated that the CA team and 2C PL would stay behind with the DDC until they came up with a project list.
-3F6 stated that at 0900L tomorrow we would meet again at the DC in order to get the DDCs final decision.
-3F6 and the ANA BDE CDR left the shura at that point.
-1 hour later, the DDC managed to come to an agreement on a common school located at a central location. 2C moved to the school site along with the DDC in order to confirm the site.

8SEP07, Shawk, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR
ANA along with the CMA and HTT teams conducted a MEDCAP / VETCAP at the Waze Zadran DC. Exact numbers of patients are not available ATT however, initial reports indicate at least 130 men and over 70 women.

INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

9SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR: AAR for Khyber Ops.

1LT Newman CA Team, AAR for Khyber Ops.

Report key: 57079A41-7B1C-4C7C-B496-64F1FC2BC23B
Tracking number: 2007-252-024621-0978
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070909n968 RC EAST 33.36872864 69.4108963
2007-09-09 15:03 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0

GARDEZ PRT KHYBER OPS REPORT DTG: 091545Z SEP 07

LAST 24:
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES Unit: PRT Gardez

POLITICAL: NSTR

MILITARY:
9SEP07, Waze Zadran, 1LT Orsini CA Team,
Movement from Waze Zadran to the ANA TAC for AAR.

9SEP07, Gerda Zerai, 1LT Newman CA Team,
ANA conducted a shura with the Gerda Serai DDC at the District Center. They discussed the future school which will be built with the $100K funds per province. All the tribal members got together and decide to call the school Unity School. Children from all 4 of the main tribes will attend the school. The DDC came to this decision after 3F6 threatened to withdraw all funds from the DDC if it did not agree to a project list. The DDC members sign a contract guaranteeing the security of the building.
Participated of an AAR at the ANA TAC.

9SEP07, Waze Zadran, PRT Medic, HTT, and SECFOR
Participated of an AAR at the ANA TAC and movement to FOB Gardez.

INFRASTRUCTURE: NSTR
INFORMATION: NSTR
PROJECT STATUS: NSTR
SCHEDULED IO EVENT: NSTR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS: NSTR

NEXT 24 HOURS:

10SEP
Khyber Ops:
1LT Orsini CA Team, at Ops Khyber closing shura.

1LT Newman CA Team, at Ops Khyber closing shura.

Report key: C97E7553-6304-48F1-A3B5-3894EB7DB330
Tracking number: 2007-252-154500-0018
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: GARDEZ PRT (PRT 6) (351 CA BN)
Unit name: GARDEZ PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3822492241
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070923n936 RC EAST 33.13362122 68.83656311
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-09-23 16:04 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL

Last 24:
Summary of Activities: Unit: PRT SHARANA DTG: 2007-09-23

Commanders Summary: (S//REL The leadership continued to QA/QC and refine EOT awards. The PRT vehicle situation is seven of seventeen UAH FMC. Our one LMTV is operational. We have four of four MK19s and four of four M2s FMC.
Political: (S//REL) The PRT CDR , CMOC Director, and both CAT-A teams traveled to Zwaka village in Omna District. They met with Hajji Mohammed and Saidfullah Khan.
We distributed humanitarian assistance to approximately 250 people. Each person received a blanket, radio, a bag of flour, a bag of beans, a bag of rice, a bag of sugar, and various clothing. We handed out children''s HA to approximately 200 boys and 100 girls. The Medical section treated around 45 patients.
The people of Zwaka have a positive policing operation going on in their village. The village elders told us that the village performs shift-work throughout the night, monitoring the roads for strangers.
The village elders initially were hesitant to help us distribute the HA. However, once we identified a place to distribute the HA and told the elders that we brought enough HA for 250 families, they were pleased to help us. Mr. Khan was very helpful throughout the operation, but Saidfullah was a problem throughout. We will select someone else from Saidfullahs side of the village to assist us in future HA distributions.

PAKTIKA GOVERNOR Location next 24hrs and districts visited this week – Governor Khpalwak is currently in Paktia.
Sunday, September 23, 2007

Province In Province (Y/N) Location Districts Visited
Paktika N Paktia Paktia, Kabul

Military: (S//REL) NSTR
Economic: (S//REL) NSTR
Security: (S//REL) Last night in Bermel, the new school that is being built by the PRT was attacked with an IED according to TF Eagle. Today the contractor for the school called the PRT and verified that the attack had occurred and there was another device on the site. TF Eagle has coordinated for TF Paladin to travel to the site for exploitation of the second device.
TF Eagle detected ACMs ICOM radio traffic regarding a plan for attacking a CF base in the district of Sar Hawzeh. While there are no CF bases in Sar Hawzeh there is the new District Center and several other PRT projects with security walls that insurgents may be assuming as a new CF base. Also, the PMT-D make frequent trips to Sar Hawzeh to meet with contractors at their respective construction sites. ACMs may have interpreted the PMT-D presence at the construction sites as CF setting up a base.

Infrastructure: (S//REL) Engineering met and discussed weekly status updates for the Provincial Attorneys building CERP project as well as the SHARANA Center for Education Excellence project. For the Attorneys Building, site drainage and utility installation details were discussed. Also pictures were presented to the PRT showing the placing of the first floor RCC slab. Management issues were discussed for DISCON Construction Company, relating to their current deficiencies in the lack of coordinated work activities. However, both projects are moving forward.
ADR package for a Clinic Expansion in KK district was routed for CoC approval signatures.
Reports received via TF EAGLE regarding the GAYAN DC project. Site pictures indicate the project is on schedule.
Information: (U//REL) Today Team Sharana conducted a Humanitarian Assistance Distribution and MEDCAP in the village of Zwaka, Omna. The Medical personnel treated 45 people and handed out HA to 250 adults, 200 boys, and 100 girls. We will develop a story for Voice of Paktika and Radio Shkin.

Voice of Paktika: NSTR

Scheduled IO Event:
Event Type: Sar Hawza DC Ribbon Cutting
Estimated DTG of Event: 27 SEP 07
Attendees: Paktika 6, NDS 6, ANP 6, Dir. RRD, Sharana 6,
Additional Support Required: N/A

ANP Integrated: ANA Integrated: Coordinated through GOA:
YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO

DC/PCC Updates: (S//REL) NSTR

ANP Status: NSTR

(S//REL) Current Class# 45 pax currently in TNG at Gardez RTC,
(S//REL) Awaiting Training: forming new training class
(S//REL) Total Trained: 369 pax

Key Leader Engagements:
Governor: N/A
District Leader: N/A
Chief of Police: N/A
National Directorate of Security: N/A

Next 96 Hours:

(S//REL) 24 SEP Team D will conduct combat patrol to FOB Rushmore IOT attend the weekly Provincial Security Council meeting and QA/QC Sharan Bazaar, Sharana Justice Center, and Sharan to OE road construction. Sharana A (-) will conduct combat patrol to FOB Kushamond with MPs.

(S//REL) 25 SEP Team D will conduct combat patrol to FOB Rushmore IOT attend the weekly Provincial Development Council meeting. Sharana A (-) will conduct combat patrol to Dila IOT locate sites for a future ANP / ANA combat outpost.

(S//REL) 26 SEP Team Sharana will conduct drivers training with a focus on night time driving IOT prepare for future operations. Sharana A (-) will conduct combat patrol to Dila IOT continue the search for a future COP.

(S//REL) 27 SEP Sharana B and Sharana C conduct combat patrol to Sar Hawze IOT to conduct a Ribbon Cutting Ceremony for the new district center. Sharana C will continue on to FOB Orgun-E IOT meet with HTT elements an plan for upcoming operations.

Report key: 33B2C19A-53F5-4C24-8BE3-CF8821560EEE
Tracking number: 2007-266-164126-0917
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: SHARANA PRT
Unit name: SHARANA PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SVB8475566112
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20070929n919 RC EAST 33.13362122 68.83656311
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-09-29 16:04 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0

Last 24:
Summary of Activities: Unit: PRT SHARANA DTG: 2007-09-29

Commanders Summary: (S//REL The PRT vehicle situation is eleven of seventeen UAH FMC. Our one LMTV is nmc. We have four of four MK19s and four of four M2s FMC.

Political: (S//REL) NSTR

PAKTIKA GOVERNOR Location next 24hrs and districts visited this week – Governor Khpalwak is currently in Sharana.
Saturday, September 29, 2007

Province In Province (Y/N) Location Districts Visited
Paktika Y Sharana KABUL

Military: (S//REL) NSTR
Economic: (S//REL) NSTR

Security: (S//REL) Reported insurgent activity was low in Paktika Province today. A walk-in source in TF Eagle AO reported that there was a Police Hilux truck in Naka district rigged with explosives to be used as an RCIED. The source reported that ACM are planning to target FOB Orgun with the vehicle. However, due to its proximity, the Zerok COP is also assessed to be a target. A few days ago a suicide bomber wearing an ANP uniform in Nangahar Province tried to detonate himself after a bomb prematurely detonated in the car he and another individual was traveling in. He was killed by CF when he tried to actuate the device as CF and ANP approached him to render first aid. Insurgents are continuing to use the TTP of disguising themselves as ANP/ANA to get closer to their targets.

Infrastructure: (S//REL) Met with NCCL and discussed issues needing to be addressed such as traffic control and earthwork completion prior to contractor continuing on with other work activities. PRT awaiting additional test reports for review and approval.
PRT Engineers visited the SHARAN Center for Educational Excellence, the prospective site for the future Paktika Vocational Ag. Center and as well the future site for the AUP HQs building in SHARAN. Additional fund requests were submitted for 3 ongoing PRT CERP projects.

Information: (U//REL) Today the PRT IO received Education PSYOP from TF Fury PSYOP. The Education material consisted of Banners, Calendars, School Bags, and Soccer Balls. During the mission to QA/QC Road Construction the PRT Engineers handed out over 150 handbills stating the status of the Sharan to OE road construction, Sharan CEE, and the recently completed Computer Education equipment. Tomorrow for the Mata Khan DC Ribbon Cutting we will be handing out ISAF newspapers, handbills depicting ongoing projects in Mata Khan, support ANP/ANA, Calendars, and Soccer Balls (the markings/print on the soccer balls have been inspected by our Cultural Advisors and will not offend anyone).

Voice of Paktika:
ANA Engineers will be coming to Dila district soon to build the ANA and ANP outpost. The Outpost will be built inside the DC. This happened while the Government Officials traveled to Dila district to find a location for a new ANA and ANP Outpost. The ANA commander in Paktika province said "this will be a great step for having good security".

Scheduled IO Event:
Event Type: Mata Khan DC Ribbon Cutting
Estimated DTG of Event: 30 SEP 07
Attendees: Paktika 6, NDS 6, ANP 6, Dir. RRD, Sharana 6,
Additional Support Required: N/A

Event Type: Yaya Khel DC Ribbon Cutting
Estimated DTG of Event: 18 OCT 07
Attendees: Paktika 6, NDS 6, ANP 6, Dir. RRD, Sharana 6,
Additional Support Required: N/A

ANP Integrated: ANA Integrated: Coordinated through GOA:
YES/NO YES/NO YES/NO

DC/PCC Updates: (S//REL) NSTR

ANP Status: NSTR

(S//REL) Current Class# 29 pax currently in TNG at Gardez RTC
(S//REL) Awaiting Training: Recruiting for a class starting 06OCT
(S//REL) Total Trained: 485 pax

Key Leader Engagements:
Governor: N/A
District Leader: N/A
Chief of Police: N/A
National Directorate of Security: N/A

Next 96 Hours:

(S//REL) 30 SEP Team B and C will conduct combat patrol to MATA KHAN IOT to escort and attend the MATA KHAN DC Ribbon Cutting Ceremony. On the return trip these teams will QA/QC the Sharan Bazaar Road, Sharan CEE, Sharan Justice Center, and Sharan to OE Road Construction.

(S//REL) 01 OCT Team D will conduct combat patrol to FOB RUSHMORE IOT attend the Provincial Security Council Meeting and to QA/QC the SHARAN BAZAAR road.

(S//REL) 02 OCT Team D will conduct combat patrol to FOB RUSHMORE IOT attend the Provincial Development Council Meeting and QA/QC Sharan Justice Center and Sharan CEE construction.

(S//REL) 03 OCT Team C will conduct combat patrol to FOB OE IOT attend the HTT meeting with TF Eagle, QA/QC OE side of Sharan to OE road, and conduct medical assessment of OE Hospital.

Report key: 340AAD27-7739-4E1B-BD77-0F7F0A9DCDAE
Tracking number: 2007-272-164950-0150
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: SHARANA PRT
Unit name: SHARANA PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SVB8475566112
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

AFG20071003n1007 RC EAST 32.68524933 69.10987091
2007-10-03 10:10 Friendly Action Escalation of Force FRIEND 0

At a little after 0950z a Bulldog (Engineer) convoy, traveling north from Bermel to OE had an escalation of force, south of Rabat. 1 x LN vehicle was traveling south toward them at a high rate of speed. 1-2 x rounds of SAF was eventually fired in front of the vehicle after visual warning had failed. The LN vehicle was not damaged and stopped as the convoy continued movement north.

At 1010z The Bulldog element came across an ANA ETT convoy who were traveling south from OE to BER. The ANA ETT convoy had received SAF and RPGs shortly before Bulldogs arrival sustaining 5 x WIA (1 GSW hand, 1 x GSW to the back, and shrapnel wounds) 3 x damaged ANA vehicles and 1 x UAH with blown tires. MOD/Bulldog recovered the vehicles as CASEVAC to BER was conducted. The two gunshot victims came to the aid station and claimed to have been caught in the cross fire of a firefight between ANA and Taliban fighters. The two victims were driving from Angorada, Bermel. They said that at 1400L the ANA stopped there vehicle and told them to get down and that was when the firefight started. They said they were 50 Taliban fighters and they were unsure as to how many ANA forces were present. The firefight lasted an hour and a half. MM(E) 10-03D

Event closed at 1207Z.

——————————————

TF Eagle Patrol to Rabat Village and Response to Direct Fire TIC in Sarobi District

TF Eagle (C Company) escorted elements from B/864th Engineers to Rabat where it was planned for them to continue movement unescorted to FOB Orgun. Shortly after separating from C Company, B/864th Engineers they encountered an ANA patrol that had just been in direct fire contact. They discovered an ANA truck with two ANA soldiers that had gunshot wounds. Upon hearing the direct fire, C Company had moved to once again link up with B/864th and the rest of the ANA element and the ETTs arrived as well. ACM had ambushed the ANA and ETT patrol along Route Dodge leading from Rabat north to FOB Orgun. The ANA had 5 WIA and there was 1 ETT WIA. Three ANA trucks were disabled and one ETT UAH was badly damaged. C Company assisted the ETTs and ANA repair their vehicles and escorted the entire patrol back to FOB Bermel. Medics at FOB Bermel treated the wounded soldiers, they will be ground evacuated tomorrow (ETT was RTD). Later in the day, two fighting aged males showed up at FOB Orgun E with gun shot wounds. These two men claimed to have been ambushed by the ANA, but the ETTs and the ANA reported there were no civilians at the ambush location. The two local nationals were treated and escorted to Salerno for additional medical treatment. The Fury S-2 shop enrolled the two local nationals into BATS and will have HTT interview today.

ISAF Tracking 10-085.

Report key: D7AB36A0-0C72-4C2B-B7C2-0C0473938BAD
Tracking number: 2007-276-120745-0346
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF PACEMAKER (864 ENG)
Unit name: TF PACEMAKER
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB1030016400
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE

AFG20080126n1083 RC EAST 33.43664932 69.03085327
2008-01-26 15:03 Non-Combat Event Meeting NEUTRAL 0

Reports on the Zormat Road Project pay day, HTT assesements of the Zormat bazaar, and the PRT assessment of Shakyan village is attached.

SEE ATTACHED [not attached by Wikileaks]

Report key: 03074BB3-66E7-42AC-AE39-816B02A4E826
Tracking number: 2008-026-151332-0906
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB0286899696
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

RC EAST: 27JAN08 TF Fury PRT Gardez conducts KLE with the Zormat Chief of Police IVO Zormat DC
Who: CPT Cho (3F S9), CPT Dost Mohammad (Zormat Police Chief), LT Richards (B40), 1x interpreter

What: Conducted a meeting at FOB Zormat in order to discuss the following:
-Allegations of corruption amongst the labor supervisors for the Zormat unimproved road project
-Tax collection at the Zormat District Center
-The District ban on motorcycles in Zormat

When: 27JAN08

Where: FOB Zormat

Why:
1)Allegations of corruption in the Zormat unimproved road project:
3F S9 received information from the HTT after conducting population assessments at the Zormat Bazaar area that some of the road project supervisors may be siphoning money from the workers. 3F S9 asked the ANP chief to conduct a formal investigation of the allegations and brief B6 of his findings after one week. The ANP Cheif swore to seek out the sources of these allegations.
2)Tax collection at the Zormat DC:
The Zormat Chief of police stated that tax collection at the District Center was a complete legitimate process that started during the time of the Taliban. He reported that all the money was deposited into government bank account in Gardez (Afghanistan Bank). According to the CoP, the taxes were collected by private contractors hired by the Ministry of Municipalities in Kabul. Taxes are levied primarliy on the shop owners in the Bazaar. The tax rates were based upon 6% of whatever stockages were in the individual shops and the ANP chief was responsible for enforcing the collection of taxes. Normally, tax collection is supposed to be managed by a bazaar mayor, however, there is no mayor at Zormat at this time.
3)Motorcycle ban in Zormat:
According to the Police Chief, motorcycles were used extensively by Taliban forces before the ban. The motorcycles served as a significant force multiplier for the Taliban as it provide maneuverability and stealth. The Police Chief stated that the district center was prepared to provide registration for motorcycles in Zormat, however, in order to do so the government required an elder from each of the tribes to vouch for the motorcycle owners. However, due to the weak tribal system and the almost systematic eradication of elders by the Taliban, the district center was unable to implement the motorcycle registration process. According to the HTT the ban on motorcycles is a significant point of contention amongst the people of Zormat towards the government. 3F S9 will discuss the feasibility of using this high demand for motorcycles in order to empower local elders in the district (i.e. re-establish the tribal system) with the Zormat DC. By giving local elders the power to vouch for locals who need motorcycles (the demand for which is great at this time due to sky rocketing fuel prices) we may be able to use this problem to our advantage.
Report key: 5DDF8BBF-A953-4168-BE80-956D5F0DADD8
Tracking number: 2008-027-164804-0812
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB0395399493
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
Affiliation NEUTRAL
Type Non-Combat Event
Category Meeting
Date 2008-01-27 16:04

AFG20080127n1173 RC EAST 34.2779007 70.08203888
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2008-01-27 17:05 Non-Combat Event Meeting NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0

The following report was compiled by MAJ Matos, PRT Gardez CA CDR:

On January 27, 2008, the Zormat DC, ANA, PRT, HTT, and Psychological operations team visited Sede Khel Village.

The District Commissioner talked about the following:
Unity
We all are Islams.
Not all have knowledge because, we have being fighting.
Make a shura and elect your leader.
Peace will not be brought by gun. We need to talk, discuss, and negotiate.
Three centuries we have killed each others. We have lost 1.5 Millions mortars but, have failed in making this country free.

Government
Because of the Bonn agreement signed in Germany we have an elected president.
Afghanistan has elected government officials (President, parliament, constitution).
This is a government of freedom with freedom of speech.
If we support the government we would not have the current problems.
My office is open to you, to the Taliban, to anyone that wants to talk.
I will go to the villages but, we need time to solve these issues.

Reconstruction
Why the younger work in other countries? There are good opportunities here if there is no fight.
We have natural resources but, we do not even know how to work with those. That is why we need assistance from the foreigners.
If we a pipeline that goes to other countries we will have more jobs.
The Arab Countries is a beautiful example of working together for the progress. Why we are in poor conditions?
We have 400 road workers in Zormat.
Electricity for the Bazaar will be a future project.

ANA, Religious Cultural Advisor, talked about the following:
OPN SM
This operation was conducted to listen to you, to unit the people, separate the enemy from you, bring security, and bring reconstruction projects.
Work with the government because, if not this opportunity will not happen again.

Village needs and comments
We need water wells
We need schools. We have 100 families and they do not even know how to write their name.
In 8 years no one has done anything for us, no facilities.
The government has not showed, asked, solved, and will not solved our petitions.
We lost 30 people in previous fights and the government did not even ask for their names, answer this.
We have beautiful security here but, we need security from both sides.
If you are truthful we will go to your shuras but, you got to be with us.

DC talking points after the Villagers comments
If you do not come to the shuras for 1, 2, 3 years you will be late in the reconstruction for that amount of time.
You need leadership to represent you at the government.
We will do water projects but, you will do the caress.
In the future 4 more schools will be built in Zormat.
Sit together and lots of problems will get solved.
It is not easy to rebuild when the enemy has destroyed all areas for years.
You have not seen what is being done in other areas of Paktya.

Key elders present:
Haji Nurgul
Hommid Khasmir
Mohammad Salin
Abdul
Pachan Khan
Anwar Khan
Karim
Sahir
Hid Mohammad
Amir Mohammad
Panis Chi
Panas

At a later conversation with the DC he mentioned the following:
When he was the DC for Jaji he started stopping truck to check if they were exporting minerals illegally (Asking for the tax papers). After that he receives a call from parliament members to stop doing that.
People in parliament do not want peace for Zormat. (Maj Matos asked him: Why is this?) As an example, he mentioned that Uyounio Kanony, Chief of Parliament has being getting lots of money since the Americans are here. If everything is solved we will not have to pay him.

Report key: B5BD7307-D393-4EDC-8F74-F143F376BC15
Tracking number: 2008-027-171630-0171
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWC9959993499
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

RC EAST: 28 JAN 08 TF 3 FURY conducts Tribal Shura Meeting IVO Zormat DC
28JAN08 Zormat Tribal Shura
LOCATION: Zormat District Center
ATTENDEES:Zormat District Commissioner, CPT Faisul (1Kandak RCA), CPT Cho (3F S9), Haji Eido (head of shura) Zormat tribal shura members, Gorjay tribal edlers, HTT

SITUATION:
-The district commissioner conducted a district tribal shura at the district center today. Unexpectedly, elders from the village of Gorjay arrived at the tribal shura in order to plead the release of 3 detainees that had been incarcerated on the 27JAN08.

Elders:
-The elders of Gorjay stated that CF and ANSF forces should leave the village once the cordon and search operations were completed. He claimed that our prolonged presence at the center of the village only put the local villagers at risk. The elders feared TB attacks against CF and ANSF forces staging out of the village, which would in turn put the villagers at risk. They claimed that the CF and the ANSF were more than welcome to search the homes of suspected TB members, but dont linger in populated areas.
-The elders also vouched for the innocence of the 3 men detained on the 27JAN08. They asked for their release.
District Commissioner:
-The DC asked how the elders of Gorjay expected the IRoA and the CF to cooperate with them when they refused to cooperate with the IRoA.
-DC stated that an investigation was underway and that if the 3 men were found innocent, they would be released.
-The DC emphasized again the need for tribal unity against the TB and the current golden opportunity for development and progress.
-He stated that if the people of Afghanistan found unity and learned to solve its own problems, the CF would leave.
Elders:
-The elders stated that the IRoA was not strong enough to provide security in Zormat. That it was too week to be relied upon. They stated that the DC didnt have the power to make the CF leave.
District Commissioner:
-The DC assured the elders that once Zormatis learned to secure its own villages, the CF would leave. He then asked why only Zormat had so many problems. How many young men from Gorjay have joined the ANSF?
Elders:
-Elders stated that many of them traveled abroad for long periods of time in order to provide for their families. As a result they could not vouch for their young mens behavior. The temptation to join the TB for prestige and money was too great.-The elders stated that CF soldiers raided the homes of the 3 detainees on the 27th without ANSF support.
-3FS9 responded by telling them that that was against the rules and that the CF would never enter a Qalat unless it received direct fire from one.
-The elders thanked 3F S9 for the explanation.

Haji Eido:
-Eido asked if the CF kept records of their cordon and searches. He claimed that in the past couple of years, his home alone was searched 7 times. He asked why that was.
-Eido stated that the reason there was so much TB presence and activity in Gorjay and Dalwatzai villages is because the TB knew that the people of Gorjay and Dalwatzai supported the IRoA. He stated that ongoing operations and detentions in the two villages ironically served to punish the people for their support of the IRoA.
-Except for the cordon and search of the home in Gorjay on the 27th, Haji Eido complimented the ANSF on their conduct throughout OPN S&M. He stated that the ANP and ANA actually asked permission to enter Qalats from local elders and mullahs and that they behaved very well when conducting searches. They insured that they got permission to enter Qalats and that the women of the household were properly segregated during the search.
-He also stated that the 3 detainees from Gorjay stated that they had many suspicious electronic devices at their homes because electronics were their hobbies. They loved watching foreign movies on their cell phones (3F S9 almost gagged on his chai with incredulity at this point).
-Eido stated that the ban on Motorcycles was a growing problem for the people of Zormat. It had a significant economic impact upon the local residents and it did nothing to hinder the ACM from riding motorcycles. He claimed that it was only the innocent that were harmed by the ban on motorcycles. The ban also served to significantly discredit the IRoA and its judgment as no other district in Paktya had a similar ban.

HTT:
-Rep. from the HTT asked what weaknesses the Zormat Tribal shura had.

Haji Eido:
-Eido stated that there were many weaknesses in Zormat. One of them being geographic. He stated that Zormat was surrounded by 4 provinces and that TB from all these provinces traveled to Zormat.
-He also stated that Zormat wasnt the problem. The problem was the lack of IRoA support. He stated that many of the elders of Zormat supported the IRoA but they have only been persecuted.
-He stated that the main weakness was with the government. For example, none of the shura members have ever been paid for their services to the district. He also stated that a number of elders have been imprisoned and sent to BAF and Guantanamo by the former corrupt ANP.
-Another major issue that Haji Eido identified with the IRoA was the predominance of high ranking former communists in the provincial level government. He stated the example of the former governor Rahmatullah and the current provincial CoP, BG Esmatullah. Both were communist aparachniks under the old communist regime and they are much hated by the predominantly former mujahadeen elders in Zormat.

Key HTT findings at the Bazaar area:
-The return of the old ANP from Jalalabad is much feared. Many local residents have stated that they will rise up in armed revolt if the old ANP ever came back.
-The HTT team was almost mobbed by local shop owners and residents at the Bazaar when the issue of the ban on motorcycle use came up. The following are the negative effects of the ban:
1) The ACM are the only ones riding motorcycles in Zormat at this time.
2) The rising price of fuel is forcing people to pay extreme prices of taxis or walk long distances in the snow.
3) Business in the central bazaar has suffered significantly this year due to the lack of consumers traveling to the bazaar.

Report key: E8C91523-DBDB-4EFB-B4FA-3BD71B95D129
Tracking number: 2008-028-155934-0656
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB0286899696
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
Affiliation NEUTRAL
Type Non-Combat Event
Category Meeting
Date 2008-01-28 15:03

RC EAST: (EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) TURN IN RPT : 0 INJ/DAM
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
(S//REL) On 18 May 08 two members of the Human Terrain Team (HTT) came to the Task Force Paladin CEXC Cell in Salerno to drop off several devices that had been received from a source. The devices consist of one MOD 5 DTMF receiver, one MOD 2 DTMF receiver, two 9 volt batteries and four AA batteries with their original box.

ITEMS RECOVERED
(C//REL). One (1x) green paper box used to house the MOD 2 DTMF device. The box is 14cm (L) x 7.75cm (W) x 2.5cm (H) and has dark green printing of AUTOMATIC, HEATER TIMER, 9 VOLT DC., BEST QUALITY, TOSHIBA ELECTRONICS. Marked in black marker was 3N on the front, back, and lid of the box.

(C//REL) One (1x) MOD 2 DTMF device. This measures 7.5cm (W) x 10cm (L) x 2.5cm (H) and is marked AUTOMATIC, HEATER TIMER, 9 VOLT DC., BEST QUALITY, TOSHIBA ELECTRONICS. Six (6x) Single Strand Single Core (SSSC) wires extend from the MOD 2 device. The first wire is white, yellow, and blue 3.3cm (L) x 1.4mm (D). The second wire is white and brown 3.2cm (L) x 1.4mm (D). The third wire is black 6m (L) x 0.9mm (D). The last three wires are red and very in length being 7.5cm (L) x 1.1mm (D), 3.6cm (L) x 1.1mm (D) and 3.5cm (L) x 1.1mm (D).

(C//REL) Two (2x) 9 volt Energizer Industrial batteries.

(C//REL) Four (4x) AA Energizer Industrial batteries and one box that contains four (4x) Energizer Industrial batteries 5.3cm (L) x 6cm (W) x 1.5cm (H).

(C//REL) One (1x) MOD 5 device in a blue and gold paper box with Chinese markings. Markings on the box are FENGHWD, LENGHWA BALL PEN CO., LTD. The box measures: 16.5cm (L) x 5.5cm (W) x 3cm (H) x 0.2mm (T).

(C//REL) One (1x) MOD 5 device 17cm (L) x 5.5cm (W) x 3.5cm (H). The MOD 5 device is housed in a black and brown colored plastic box, with black marking on the bottom. Most of the writing is in a regional language except the following in English: 151510, C-1-3. There are five (5x) Single Strand Multi Core (SSMC) wires extending from the MOD 5 device. There are three (3x) black (SSMC) wires that very in length being 35cm (L) x 1.7mm (D), 33cm (L) x 1.7mm (D) and 32cm (L) x 1.7mm (D). The others are one orange (SSMC) wire 33cm (L) x 1.6mm (D) and one pink (SSSC) wire 173cm (L) x 0.6mm (D).

Report key: A587B1B8-F208-FF93-111961186334C69E
Tracking number: 20080518120042SWB8904092070
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: JTF Paladin SIGACT Manager
Unit name:
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: JTF Paladin SIGACT Manager
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SWB8904092070
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED
Affiliation ENEMY
Type Explosive Hazard
Category Turn In
Date 2008-05-18 12:12

AFG20080614n1371 RC EAST 33.43442917 69.03022766
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2008-06-14 03:03 Non-Combat Event Demonstration NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0

ISAF N/A
42SWB 02810 99450

UNIT: TF PANTHER

TYPE: DEMONSTRATION

TIMELINE:
AT 0305Z, TF PANTHER REPORTS OF A NON-HOSTILE DEMONSTRATION BEING CONDUCTED IN ZORMAT.
PANTHER HTT RECEIVED REPORTS OF POSSIBLE SUICIDE BOMBERS AROUND THE DEMONSTRATION AREA. TF PANTHER WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR SITUATION AND DETERMINE WHAT THE REASON IS FOR THIS DEMONSTRATION.

AT 0510Z, DEMONSTRATION IS MOVING ON RTE COYOTE TOWARDS THE COP. LN’S ARE TEARING DOWN A SIGN AT WC 033 001.

AT 0529Z, REPORTED THAT THE CROWD IS NOW MOVING BACK TOWARDS THE BAZAAR.

AT 0559Z, PANTHER REPORTS THE ZORMAT POLICE CHIEF STATED THAT ANP FIRED UNK TYPE OF WEAPON SYSTEM KILLING 1 LN AND WOUNDING 5. PANTHER IS INVESTIGATING THIS CURRENT REPORT.

AT 0611Z ZORMAT COP REPORTS THE THE CROWD IS STARTING TO DISPERSE.

AT 0727Z, CROWD HAS DISPERSED. DEMONSTRATION NO LONGER HAPPENING AT THIS TIME.

SUMMARY:
DEMONSTRATION

BDA: (UNCONFIRMED)
1 X LN KIA
5 X LN WIA

EVENT CLOSED AT 0727Z

Report key: 8C36060B-B7FE-E18A-2DAFB63711388BE1
Tracking number: 20080614030542SWB0281099450
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: TF Currahee SIGACT Manager S-3
Unit name:
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: TF Currahee SIGACT Manager S-3
Updated by group: 101 Bridge SIGACTS Manager
MGRS: 42SWB0281099450
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN

RC EAST: (EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) IED FOUND/CLEARED RPT (RCIED) TF WHITE EAGLE IVO (ROUTE FLORIDA): 0 INJ/DAM
UNIT: TF WHITE EAGLE

TYPE: RCIED

TIMELINE:
AT 1030Z, AN HTT PATROL LOCATED AN RCIED NEAR FOB RUSHMORE ON RTE FLORIDA. THE HTT PATROL IS CURRENTLY SECURING THE IED LOCATION AND WAITING FOR EOD TO ARRIVE TO EXPLOIT.

UPDATE: AT 1430Z TF WHITE EAGLE REPORTED THAT EOD DESTROYED THE IED, NFTR.
SUMMARY: RCIED
EVENT CLOSED AT 1830Z
Report key: 75F44FBA-E5B8-35DA-3AFFA703113DF3F8
Tracking number: 20080730115842SVB7788169478
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: TF Currahee SIGACT Manager S-3
Unit name: TF WHITE EAGLE
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: TF Currahee SIGACT Manager S-3
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SVB7788169478
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED
Affiliation ENEMY
Type Explosive Hazard
Category IED Found/Cleared
Date 2008-07-30 11:11

[RE: Paula Loyd]
AFG20081104n1440 RC SOUTH 31.62137413 65.05375671
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2008-11-04 06:06 Friendly Action Attack FRIEND 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 1 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 1 0

ISAF # 11-0181

ON 4 NOV AT 1010 C36 REPORTS CONTACT AT 41RPR 94800 00300. 1xUS CIV WIA AND 1X AAF KIA. 9 LINER HAS BEEN SENT UP AND MEDVAC IS ON THE WAY.
WHILE CONDUCTING PATROL IN A VILLAGE ABOUT 500M SOUTH WEST OF HUTAL DC. HTT WERE TALKING WITH LN FOR SEVERAL MINUTES. 1xAAF MALE HAD A JUG OF GASOLINE IN HIS HAND, HE THAN POUR IT ON THE HTT PERSONEL AND LIT IT ON FIRE.

MEDVAC ARRIVES AT FOB HUTAL AT 1103 AND LANDS AT FOB BASTION ROLE 3 AT 1134 WITH US CIV CASUALITY.

INVESTIGATION PENDING

Report key: 67996D88-FEDA-8412-4C540207A062009F
Tracking number: 20081104060141RPR9480000300
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: A SIGACTS MANAGER
Unit name: 2-2 IN
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
Updated by group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
MGRS: 41RPR9480000300
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE

AFG20081104n1457 RC SOUTH 31.62137413 65.05375671
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2008-11-04 10:10 Criminal Event Other ENEMY 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 1 0
Wounded in action 0 0 1 0

C Coy 2-2 Inf while conducting a NFO patrol at MAYWAND DC 1 x INS threw a Molotov cocktail over a wall at the patrol. FF engaged with SAF. Casualties reported.

***Event closed at 1445D*

UPDATE 1556D*
***STORY REWRITTEN*
(based on RC(S) report)

A HUMAN TERRAIN TECHNICIAN (HTT) team (US civilians working with TF 2-2), were meeting with a LN 500m SOUTH of the MAYWAND DC. The LN was carrying a jug of gasoline, which he abruptly used to douse the female member of the team and light her on fire, resulting in a CAT A wounded. The LN attempted to flee but was shot and killed by TF 2-2 personnel. The CAT A casualty was brought to FOB HUTAL for MEDEVAC to BSN. It was subsequently reported by RR6 that the LN was detained and later allegedly shot by a second HTT. Update on category and title.

UPDATE 042030D*NOV08
RC(S) reports a U.S. investigation has been initiated.1 Non Battle Injuries, Category A american(USA) Civilian
1 Killed None(None) Local Civilian

Report key: 256FE79C-29C3-4059-9D5C-E70CE6CFCEC3
Tracking number: 41RPR94800003002008-11#0181
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: A SIGACTS MANAGER
Unit name: C Coy 2-2 Inf
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: RC (S)
Updated by group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
MGRS: 41RPR9480000300
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED

Event Title:D3 0446Z
Zone:1x U.S WIA 0x KIA
Placename:ISAF #08-1024
Outcome:Ineffective

****reporting unit 3-71CAV****

S: 6-7 ENEMY PAX

A: RECEIVING RPG AND SAF

L: FRIENDLY VC 9108 4024
L: ENEMY(2x LOC) 1st- DIS-100M, DIR-NE, 2nd- DIS-100M, DIR-S

T: 0446Z

U: 3/B/1-32

R: RETURNING FIRE ATT, ENEMY FIRING FROM BEHIND QALATS

UPDATE: 12 0448Z BATTLE X REPORTS ENEMY ATTEMPTING TO BREAK CONTACT, 3/B WILL MANUEVER ON ENEMY. AWT RETASKED BY TF WINGS ETA TO BATTLE AO 0503Z

UPDATE: 12 0453Z BATTLE X REPORTS 3/B TAKING HEAVY FIRE 400M TO SE OF LAST FRIENDLY LOCATION

UPDATE: 12 0456Z TITAN X REPORTS VIPER 11 (2 X F-16) ARE ENROUTE ATT ETA UNK.

UPDATE: 12 0508Z BATTLE X REPORTS AWT ON STATION ATT. COMMS ESTABLISHED ON COMPANY NET.

UPDATE: 12 0510Z BIGDOG 34 (SQN JTAC) REPORTS CAS HAS CHECKED ON STATION PASSING A/C TO PLT JFO ATT.

UPDATE: 12 0513Z BATTLE X REPORTS 1x U.S WIA
M: GUNSHOT WOUND TO LOWER LEFT LEG
I: GRAZING/LASCERATION
S: GUNSHOT WOUND
T: CURRENTLY AT CCP, WOUND NOT BLEEDING, FIELD DRESSING
PLT CM ATT NO CASEVAC OR MEDEVAC NEEDED ATT

UPDATE: 12 0524Z BATTLE X REPORTS LULL IN CONTACT, 3/B WILL MANUEVER SOUTH THEN EAST. AWT COVERING OTHER EXFIL ROUTES.

UPDATE: 12 0546Z BIGDOG 34 REPORTS VIPER 11 REPORTS 15MIN UNTIL BINGO.

UPDATE: 12 0554Z BATTLE X REPORTS 3/B IS MOVING TO CLEAR AREA FROM WHERE THEY TOOK SAF, CURRENTLY HAVE A LULL IN SAF BIGOG 34 REPORTS F-16 REFUEL REMAIN ON STATION.

UPDA TE: 12 0604Z BIGDOG 34 REPORTS 3/B SEARCHING QULAT VIC VC 91535 40047. SETTING SBF. BATTLE X REPORTS A BURNING QULAT. GRID TO BURNING QALAT VC 91557 40103. NFI ATT

UPDATE: 12 0628Z BIGDOG 34 REPORTS MEXICAN BREAKING STATION ATT TO REFUEL AT FOB SHANK. ETA BACK ON STATION 20 MIN.

UPDATE: 12 0646Z BATTLE X REPORTS 3/B IS HAVING HTT QUESTION 15 MAMS THAT WERE IN CLOSE VIC TO BURNING QALAT THEY TOOK FIRE FROM. ALSO QUESTIONING 30-40 MALES IN THE VILLAGE. QALAT CAUGHT FIRE FROM FIREFIGHT. B32 OVERWATCHING FROM SOUTH OF QALAT.

UPDATE: 12 0648Z BATTLE X REPORTS 2/B SP DC TIME NOW ENROUTE TO CASEVAC 3/B WIA. 2/B SLANT IS 20x U.S MIL, 1x U.S CIV, 1x LN TERP AND 4x VEHICLES. AWT RETURNED ON STATION ATT.

UPDATE: 12 0710Z BATTLE X REPORTS 2/B FLT VC 9374 3974 DILIBERATELY CLEARING THE AREA ON RTE NY.

UPDATE: 12 0800Z BATTLE X REPORTS 3/B HAS SAF TO THE SW FROM UNK ENY ATT. GUIDING AWT ONTO THE AREA THEY RECEIVED CONTACT FROM USING GREEN SMOKE

UPDATE: 12 0814Z BATTLE X REPORTS AWT IS OFF STATION ATT, 3/B REPORTS LULL IN CONTACT.

UPDATE: 12 0828Z BATTLE X REPORTS 2/B HAS MADE LINK UP WITH 3/B CONDUCTING CASEVAC AT THIS TIME
B36 WILL BE DONE TALKING TO LNS IN 30-40 MINS AND THEN WILL CM. GRID TO LINK UP IS AT A QULAT VIC VC 91562 40099.

UPDATE: 12 0943Z BATTLE X REPORTS 3/B IS CONTINUING FOOT PATROL MOVEMENT TO CHARKH D.C ATT. 2/B IS EXFILLING TO CHARKH D.C W/ WIA ATT.

UPDATE: 12 1008Z BATTLE X REPORTS 4x ENY PAX ENGAGING 3/B W/SAF ATT. VIC VC 92604 400713/B RETURNED FIRE, ENEMY BROKE CONTACT, 3/B HAS CONTINUED MOVMENT BACK TO THE DC AT THIS TIME

UPDATE: BATTLE X REPORTS 3/B RECIEVING SAF FROM UNK ENY ATT. VIC VC 93243 40444. RETURNING FIRE ATT.

UPDATE: BATTLE X REPORTS 3/B RECIEVING SAF FROM THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THEIR POSITION ATT

UPDATE: 12 1039Z BIGDOG 34 REPORTS BONE 22 (B1) ON STATION ATT.

UPDATE: 12 1046Z BATTLE X REPORT LULL IN ENY FIRE ATT.

UPDATE: 12 1111Z BATTLE X REPORTS 2x VEHICLES FROM 2/B TO SUPPORT 3/B ATT. 2/B HAS 2x VEHICLES (MRAP) SECURING IED SITE ATT

UPDATE: 12 1112Z BATTLE X REPORTS 1x LN CIVILIAN WIA ATT. 3/B IS EVALUATING CASUALTY ATT.

UPDATE: 12 1114Z BATTLE X REPORTS NO EWIA. 2x LN WERE HELPING LN WIA. THE LN’s WERE MISTAKEN AS ENY PREVIOUSLY. THE LN WIA IS A YOUNG BOY, HE HAS 3x GSW, MEDICS ARE TREATING, HE WILL BE BROUGHT BACK TO THE DC FOR FURTHER CARE AFTER SABER IS COMPLETE WITH THE IED SITE

UPDATE:12 1641Z BATTLE X REPORTS THAT ALL ELEMENTS RTB THE CHARKH DC.

EVENT OPENED: 12 0446Z

EVENT CLOSED: 12 1641Z

——–EVENT SUMMARY——–

3/B/1-32 RECIEVED SAF AND RPG FIRE WHILE CONDUCTING A PATROL IVO DASHTE VILLAGE. 3/B REPORTED ENY 100m TO THE SOUTH AND NORTHEAST OF THE PATROL. PATROL SUFFERED 1x WIA. GUNSHOT WOUND TO LOWER LEFT LEG. GRAZING/LASCERATION GUNSHOT WOUND. 3/B CLEARED THE LOCAL AREA AS AWT CONDUCTED SWEEPS OF SUSPECTED ENY EXFIL RTE. 3/B HAD HCT QUESTION 15 MAMS THAT WERE IN CLOSE VIC TO QALAT THEY TOOK FIRE FROM. ALSO QUESTIONING 30-40 MALES IN THE VILLAGE. QALAT CAUGHT FIRE FROM FIREFIGHT. 2/B SP CHARKH JCOP W/MEDRAP TO EXFIL U.S WIA. AFTER L/U AND WHILE BEGINNING EXFIL 2/B STRUCK IED. 0x CASUALTIES OR DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT. 3/B REPORTED SEVERAL SAF ENGAGMENTS W/ENY FORCES. ENY BROKE CONTACT EACH TIME. 1x LN WAS WIA. 2/B TX ON SITE. CIED 14 WAS DISPATCHED FROM ALTIMUR AND CONDUCTED SSE OF IED BLAST. SABRE REPORTS THAT B26′S IED WAS A BURIED PRESSURE COOKER CWIED WITH WIRE HEADING WEST. INITIAL THOUGHTS BY CIED IS THAT IT WAS AIMED AT DISMOUNTS. VEHICLE IS UNSTUCK AND THE ELEMENT HAS RTB THE CHARKH DC

Report key: 0x080e000001230b40041716e500f68a6d
Tracking number: 200971244442SVC9108040240
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: A SIGACTS MANAGER
Unit name: B/1-32
Type of unit: CF
Originator group:
Updated by group: Embedded Data Collector
MGRS: 42SVC9108040240
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED